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Abstract
Hallucination,
cognitive
degeneration,
paranoia, body
mutilation, and suicide – these are just some of the many
deleterious
effects
of
solitary
confinement.
Despite decades of overwhelming research repeatedly proving that
solitary confinement causes permanent brain damage, the judicial
system has resisted taking a hard stance against the practice. Some
individuals are kept in these small prison cells for days, while
others are kept there for decades. The amount of time an individual
can be kept in solitary confinement is almost limitless depending on
the jurisdiction.
Following an introduction on the history of solitary
confinement, its growth in the United States, and what research
has shown us about its effects on humans, this Comment will
compare how different federal circuits have ruled in regards to how
long someone can be kept in solitary confinement for. Some circuits
seem to give more discretion to the prisons in utilizing the practice,
while others were more willing to create limits. This Comment will
also discuss the different challenges associated with the common
legal channels utilized in the fight against solitary confinement by
briefly exploring the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment,
and Qualified Immunity. Finally, this Comment will propose
several solutions. The best solution is to ban the practice. If we are
going to continue it, then the Supreme Court needs to set clear
boundaries as to how long someone can be kept in isolation,
mandate a minimum of one hour recreation time absent a
legitimate security reason, as well as ensure adequate mental
health care to those in solitary confinement. More than just a legal
right, these individuals rely on our system to fight for their sanity
and most of all, to fight for their right to be human.

I.

INTRODUCTION

“[A]bsolute solitude . . . is beyond the strength of man; it
destroys the criminal. It does not reform, it kills.”1 Imagine living
alone in a dark 7-foot by 14-foot windowless steel box for 23 hours a
day with a bare light bulb as your only source of light.2 The only
1. Gustave de Beaumont & Alexis de Tocqueville, On the Penitentiary
System in the United States and its Application in France (1833), HOUSE OF
RUSSELL,
www.houseofrussell.com/legalhistory/alh/docs/penitentiary.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2019).
2. See LEONARD ORLAND, PRISONS: HOUSES OF DARKNESS 72-78 (1975)
(describing the conditions in solitary confinement); see also Wilkinson v. Austin,
545 U.S. 209, 214 (2005) (illustrating that “inmates must remain in their cells,
which measure 7 by 14 feet, for 23 hours per day. A light remains on in the cell
at all times, though it is sometimes dimmed . . .”).
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human contact you have is through a small hole where prison
guards give you your food.3 There are no visits, no conversations, no
reading material, and in some cases, no outdoor exercise.4 Imagine
living in these conditions for months, years, and perhaps even
indefinitely.5 This is what one individual, Damon Thibodeaux, went
through after 15 years of solitary confinement in a Louisiana
correctional facility.6 After his exoneration, Thibodeaux told
senators, “Humans cannot survive without food and water . . . they
can’t survive without sleep. But they also can’t survive without
hope.”7 Hope felt so slim for Thibodeaux that he was “on the verge
of committing suicide . . . and [was] allowing the state to carry out
the sentence of death.”8 Solitary confinement destroys the human
mind.9 Thibodeaux is just one of the many inmates who
experienced, and are still experiencing, the effects of solitary
confinement.10
Another inmate, John Powers, amputated his testicle and
scrotum and bit off two fingers while in solitary confinement at the
federal ADX Florence supermax prison.11 Humans fundamentally

3. ORLAND, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. Sarah Childress, How Much Time U.S. Prisoners Spend in Solitary, PBS
(Apr. 22, 2014), www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/criminal-justice/locked-upin-america/how-much-time-u-s-prisoners-spend-in-solitary/
(noting
that
solitary confinement “typically start at 30 days but can last indefinitely” and
providing examples of inmates who have served solitary time ranging from 15
to 42 years).
6. Carrie Johnson, Solitary Confinement Costs $78K per Inmate and Should
be Curbed, Critics Say, NPR (Feb. 25, 2014), www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2014/02/25/282672593/solitary-confinement-costs-78k-per-inmate-andshould-be-curbed-critics-say (discussing how the use of solitary confinement is
both costly, counterproductive, and needs systemic reform).
7. Id. Thibodeaux also stated that “[y]ears on end in solitary, particularly in
death row, will drain that hope from anyone. Because in solitary there’s nothing
to live for . . . after realizing what my existence would be like for years on end,
until I was either executed or exonerated. . . .” Id.
8. Id.
9. Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement
is Cruel & Far Too Usual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741, 757-59 (2015)
(discussing the many research findings consistently showing deleterious effects
and documented changes in brain activity after solitary confinement).
10. Nicole Flatow, Exonerated Inmate: No One, No Matter the Crime, Can
Endure Solitary Confinement for Very Long, THINK PROGRESS (Feb. 26, 2014),
www.thinkprogress.org/exonerated-inmate-no-one-no-matter-the-crime-canendure-solitary-confinement-for-very-long-26911dfe4685/ (Thibodeaux stated
that he had sustained long-term effects from his time in solitary, including
“difficulty engaging and speaking with people on some occasion.”).
11. See, e.g. Emily Coffey, Madness in the Hole: Solitary Confinement &
Mental Health of Prison Inmates, PUB. INTEREST L. RPTR. 17, 18 (2012),
lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr/vol18/iss1/4 (illustrating how John Powers’ time in
solitary confinement “drove him insane”).
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need social interaction, environmental stimulation, and activity.12
Our prison system originally incorporated rehabilitation as one of
its goals for inmates.13 Prisons were established so that inmates
could serve their time for their wrongdoing, while also providing
inmates the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves so that they can
reintegrate into society as law-abiding citizens.14 Prisoners were
given opportunities to develop occupational skills and resolve
psychological issues with the goal of reintegration into society in
mind.15 Since the mid-1970s, the prison system changed and
adopted a “get tough on crime” approach with punishment, rather
than rehabilitation and reintegration, as its main function.16 This
change has led to a drastic growth in the prison population with
very little effect on crime rates.17 Now, the United States has a
higher rate of incarceration than any other developed country in the
world.18 Despite the growing research indicating the irreversible
and deleterious effects of long-term solitary confinement, prisons
have relied on this practice since the early 1970s and continue to do
so increasingly.19
Many of these prisoners are not the “horrendous” criminals we
like to imagine as “deserving” solitary confinement.20 Rather, many
are there for minor crimes or immigration charges.21 Prisoners can
be placed in solitary confinement for many reasons, including
12. Terry A. Kupers, Isolated Confinement: Effective Method for Behavior
Change or Punishment for Punishment’s Sake?, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
FOR INT’L CRIME & JUST. STUD., 213, 215-16 (Bruce A. Arrigo & Heather Y.
Bersot, eds., 2014).
13. Etienne Benson, Rehabilitate or Punish?, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N
(July/Aug. 2003), www.apa.org/monitor/julaug03/rehab.
14. Rehabilitative Effects of Imprisonment, CRIME MUSEUM,
www.crimemuseum.org/crime-library/famous-prisonsincarceration/rehabilitative-effects-of-imprisonment/ (last visited Mar. 29,
2019).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Drew Kann, 5 Facts Behind America’s High Incarceration Rate, CNN
(July 10, 2018), www.cnn.com/2018/06/28/us/mass-incarceration-five-keyfacts/index.html (stating that the United States has a higher rate even
compared to large countries such as India and China, as well as totalitarian
countries such as Russia and the Philippines).
19. Monique Peterkin, “I’m on Fire”: A Call to Eradicate Excessive Solitary
Confinement Sentences for Nonviolent Offenses, 60 HOW. L.J. 817, 821 (2017).
20. See The Editors, Solitary Confinement is Cruel and Ineffective, SCI. AM.
(Aug. 1, 2013), www.scientificamerican. com/article/solitary-confinement-cruelineffective-unusual/ (noting that many of these inmates are not the “worst of
the worst” criminals and in actuality are placed in solitary for nonviolent
offenses, non-criminal offenses, immigration charges, as well as being placed in
solitary “for their own protection” for being homosexual, transgender, or raped
by other inmates).
21. Id.
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“punishment, for their own protection or as a preventive
measure[.]”22 Former President Barack Obama demanded that our
country challenge and rethink solitary confinement practices, as
well as address these issues head-on.23 Despite the call for change
and reform, both federal and state courts24 have instead continued
to give almost extreme deference to prison officials in determining
that many of these solitary confinement conditions are
constitutional.25 This leaves thousands of prisoners stripped of any
meaningful avenue to challenge the constitutionality of their
solitary confinement.26
22. Dan Nolan & Chris Amico, Solitary by the Numbers, FRONTLINE (Apr.
18, 2017), apps.frontline.org/solitary-by-the-numbers/.
23. See Barack Obama, Why We Must Rethink Solitary Confinement, WASH.
POST (Jan. 25, 2016), www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/barack-obama-whywe-must-rethink-solitary-confinement/2016/01/25/29a361f2-c384-11e5-89650607e0e265ce_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.cf0bbb203043
(recognizing that the psychological implications of solitary confinement were
supported by many years of research and that the practice should be a measure
of last resort, while adopting recommendations from The Justice Department
to push for prison reform); accord Report and Recommendations Concerning the
Use
of
Restrictive
Housing,
U.S.
DEPT.
OF
JUST.,
www.justice.gov/archives/dag/report-and-recommendations-concerning-userestrictive-housing (last updated Mar. 13, 2017) (stating guideline principles for
prison reform, including: housing inmates in the least restrictive setting
necessary, having a specific penological purpose when placing inmates in
solitary, regularly evaluating existing restrictive housing policies, having a
clear plan for returning inmates in less restrictive settings, and finding ways to
increase the minimum amount of time inmates spend outside their cell).
24. Though this Comment will use examples found in the federal courts, the
issue of solitary confinement affects both federal and state courts and prisons
as a systemic issue. “Courts,”as used in this Comment, will refer to both federal
and state courts generally.
25. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) (stating that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly expressed that “the federal courts ought to afford
appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials” in maintaining prisons
should they choose to keep an inmate in solitary); see Efrat Arbel, Devalued
Liberty and Undue Deference: The Tort of False Imprisonment and the Law of
Solitary Confinement, 84 SUP.CT.L.REV. 43, 46 (2018), ssrn.com
/abstract=3190520 (noting that the courts “have shown significant deference” to
a prison’s discretionary authority despite overwhelming evidence that the
authority was improperly exercised).
26. See e.g., Arbel, supra note 25, at 54 (noting that the “internal complaints
process is largely ineffective: even when prisoners report abuse, most
complaints are dismissed as incredulous.”) Challenges against solitary
confinement using judicial system tools, such as habeas corpus applications, are
also ineffective because the “remedy only provides release and does not
compensate for harm.” Id. Prisons often release prisoners in advance of filing a
habeas application which “can render the matter moot.” Id. The article also
notes that the prison’s ability to “’quickly shift the sands denies a prisoner the
opportunity to seek accountability . . . [and] when cases do go forward, courts
generally take a ‘hands-off’ approach for reviews of correctional decisionmaking and grant considerable deference to the discretionary authority of [the
prison].” Id.
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This Comment will explore the general issues with solitary
confinement, while also arguing that time limits must be set by the
Supreme Court. In doing so, Part II of this Comment will look at the
history and trends of solitary confinement in the United States. It
will also reveal years of scientific research establishing that solitary
confinement causes irreversible psychological effects, even if the
isolation is only for a short period of time. More importantly, Part
II will address the unconstitutionality of solitary confinement due
to the nature of the practice itself, and how our prison systems have
no clear prescriptive durational boundaries to determine how long
it can keep an inmate in solitary confinement for without violating
that individual’s constitutional rights. In Part III, this Comment
will analyze how different federal circuit courts have ruled on the
duration matter. Part III will also analyze how federal circuits have
ruled regarding access to outdoor exercise and assess the lack of
adequate mental health care for inmates. And finally, in Part IV,
this Comment will address these issues with several proposals
based on the many years of research conducted on solitary
confinement. These include creating definite guidelines on the
length of time an inmate can be put in solitary confinement,
establishing a mandatory requirement for prisons to give inmates
outdoor exercise absent a strong security rationale, and providing
adequate mental health care to inmates.
It is time we address the issue recognized by the Supreme
Court 40 years ago when it declared that the “length of [solitary]
confinement cannot be ignored.”27 Let us not ignore it any further.
As vehemently expressed by Charles Dickens while witnessing
solitary confinement in the United States, “Nothing wholesome or
good has ever had its growth in such unnatural solitude, even a dog
. . . would . . . rust away beneath its influence.”28

27. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978) (stating that the conditions
of confinement were unconstitutional where an inmate was held in isolation in
a small cell for long periods of time, sustained various medical diseases, received
little food, and had a toilet that could only be flushed from the outside of the
cell).
28. Michael Stern, Like “Being Buried Alive”: Charles Dickens on Solitary
Confinement in America’s Prisons, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 8, 2015),
prospect.org/article/being-%E2%80%9Cburied-alive%E2%80%9D-charlesdickens-solitary-confinement-america%E2%80%99s-prisons. During his visits
to the United States, Charles Dickens described the inmates in solitary
confinement as “[men] buried alive . . . to be dug out in the slow rounds of years
. . . and in the mean time dead to everything but torturing anxieties and horrible
despair.” Id. Charles Dickens wrote extensively about his strong views against
solitary confinement and urged for the United States to abolish this practice.
Id.
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II. BACKGROUND
Understanding the issues behind solitary confinement
requires understanding its history and how and why it grew with
time. This section will first discuss the historical timeline of solitary
confinement’s growth in America, as well as briefly explore the
international views on the practice. This section will then look at
the recent statistics relating to solitary confinement to understand
the severity of the issue through its numbers. Finally, this section
will explore the history of experimentation and research behind
solitary confinement to understand why many argue that this
practice is a human rights violation.

A. The History of Solitary Confinement in America
Solitary confinement has a long history in the United States.29
It became especially common with the rise of the modern
penitentiary during the first half of the nineteenth century.30 The
first solitary confinement practice in the United States was founded
in the Eastern State Penitentiary of Philadelphia.31 It was created
by Quakers who believed that prisoners who were isolated in their
cells with the Bible would want to use that time to “repent, pray[,]
and find introspection.”32 Contrary to the Quakers’ hopes, the
inmates actually became psychotic and resorted to suicide.33 Due to
these occurrences, the practice was subsequently abandoned for the
next few decades.34
In the late 1800s, the United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of solitary confinement in In re Medley.35 More notably, for
the first time, the Court expressed open concern regarding the
effects of solitary confinement on inmates.36 Here, Medley was
found guilty of homicide and was ordered to be placed in solitary

29. See Brooke S. Biggs, Solitary Confinement: A Brief History, MOTHER
JONES (Mar. 3, 2009), www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/03/solitaryconfinement-brief-natural-history/ (showing the change of solitary confinement
during a two-hundred-year span in the United States).
30. Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison
Inmates: A Brief History and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441,
441-42 (2006).
31. Peterkin, supra note 19, at 824.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 171 (1890) (describing the solitary
confinement conditions experienced by prisoners as “the most important and
painful character, and is, therefore, forbidden by . . . the Constitution of the
United States”).
36. Id.
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confinement until his date of execution.37 The Court found that after
a month of isolation, many prisoners kept in solitary confinement
descended into a “semi-fatuous condition[,] . . . became violently
insane[,] . . . committed suicide[,] . . . and did not recover sufficient
mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.”38
The Court ultimately decided that the “solitary confinement to
which the prisoner was subjected [to] . . . was an additional
punishment of the most important and painful character, and is,
therefore, forbidden by the provision of the Constitution of the
United States.”39
In 1934, the Federal Bureau of Prisons dismissed the Court’s
concerns and opened Alcatraz prison in San Francisco, which would
come to house some of the country’s worst criminals.40 This federal
prison was initially used in the late 1850s as a military prison
before control of the facility was transferred to the Federal Bureau
of Prisons.41 Most inmates were kept in the general population.42
Some inmates were housed in “The Hole,” which was the prison’s
solitary-confinement hallway.43 One room in this hallway, “The
Oriental,” confined inmates in a cell with no light except for a hole
in the ground.44 These inmates were kept naked and were provided
food and water through a small hole in the door.45 Other Alcatraz
37. Id. at 161-62.
38. See generally Laura Sullivan, Timeline: Solitary Confinement in the U.S.
Prisons, NPR (July 26, 2006), www. npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=5579901 (citing In re Medley and explaining the evolution of
solitary confinement in the United States).
39. In re Medley, 134 U.S. at 171.
40. Peterkin, supra note 19, at 824 n.38 (discussing Alcatraz’s history and
how Alcatraz was originally used for the military but was released to the U.S.
Department of Justice to house criminals that were too dangerous to be handled
by other penitentiaries).
41.
Alcatraz,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
PRISONS,
www.bop.gov/about/history/alcatraz.jsp (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
42. Sullivan, supra note 38 (discussing the conditions faced by those in the
general population as compared to those kept in the “D block” and in “The
Hole”).
43. RICHARD DUNBAR, ALCARAZ 35 (1999) (describing how the conditions in
the “D block” and in “The Hole” included having only a toilet, a sink, and a steel
door, which was shut twenty-four hours a day, leaving the inmates in complete
darkness). Dunbar also discussed the mental and emotional toll isolation had
on the inmates with increasing time. Id.; see also STEPHANIE WATSON, ESCAPE
FROM ALCATRAZ 22 (2012) (stating that the worst of the pitch-dark cells in the
“D block” was “The Oriental,” which had a hole in the floor as its bathroom).
44. WATSON, supra note 43.
45. Id.; See, e.g., Jim Quillen, My 19 Days in Solitary Confinement on
Alcatraz, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 6, 2015), www. telegraph.co.uk/men/thinkingman/11245414/My-19-days-in-solitary-confinement-on-Alcatraz.
html
(recalling that it was “very cold . . . because of the limited clothing you were
allowed . . . [which] were inadequate to keep one warm, because the steel walls
and floor of the cell retained the cold”).
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inmates had clothes, water, and food but were rarely released from
their cells and had no contact with other inmates.46 Alcatraz served
as an “experiment” and model for future federal prisons, as extreme
segregation at this level had not been tried before.47
The use of solitary confinement in prisons began to grow in the
mid-1960s and would continue to do so for the next twenty years.48
This growth was due in part to the state and federal penitentiaries’
response to increased violence and disorder within their prisons.49
In 1983, the first supermax prison was founded in Marion,
Illinois.50 Modeled after the Alcatraz experiment, this prison was
the first of its kind.51 It was the first prison to adopt a 23-hour-aday cell isolation rule with no communal yard time.52 This prison,
and others like it, were called “supermax facilities” because they
were created to keep inmates in solitary confinement indefinitely.53
The creation of the supermax was in response to two separate
killings on the same day at the Marion penitentiary, and the
general rise of prison violence for over a decade.54 Supermax
facilities built in the 1980s established a new norm for the prison
system.55
In 1989, California built the Pelican Bay Prison, the first
correctional facility to be completely used for housing individuals in
solitary confinement.56 The prison had no yard, cafeteria,
46. Sullivan, supra note 38.
47. U.S. Penitentiary Alcatraz, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Feb. 27, 2015),
www.nps.gov/alca/learn/historyculture/us-penitentiary-alcatraz.
htm
(discussing the history of Alcatraz and how Alcatraz was the national
government’s response to post-Prohibition and post-Depression America).
48. Alexander A. Reinert, Solitary Troubles, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 927,
940 (2018).
49. Id.
50. Sullivan, supra note 38.
51. Stephen Richards, USP Marion – The First Federal Supermax, 88
PRISON J. 6, 8 (2008) (describing the birth of the supermax prison and how the
conditions differed from all other federal penitentiaries at the time, such as the
absence of any indoor or outdoor recreational activity and the lack of a “general
population” since all prisoners were in solitary confinement).
52. Sullivan, supra note 38 (noting that solitary confinement in Marion,
Illinois arose after two correctional officers were murdered in two separate
incidents on the same day, causing the prison to be on “permanent lockdown”).
This created the first prison in the country to adopt 23-hour-a-day cell isolation
with no communal yard time. Id. Prisoners were no longer allowed to work,
attend educational programs, or eat in a cafeteria. Id. Within a few years,
several other states adopted permanent lockdown at existing facilities. Id.
53. Peterkin, supra note 19, at 825.
54. Smith, supra note 30, at 442. After the Marion incident, the prisoners
were confined solitarily in lockdown, the lockdown was never lifted, and the use
of solitary confinement became the ordinary solution for problematic prisoners.
Id.
55. Peterkin, supra note 19, at 825.
56. Sullivan, supra note 38.
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classrooms, or shops.57 The inmates spent “[twenty-two-and-a-half]
hours a day inside an [eight-by-ten-foot] cell. The other [one-and-ahalf] hours were spent alone in a small concrete exercise pen.”58
Following the California Pelican Bay Prison, America saw a boom
of supermax prisons in the 1990s.59 This type of prison was built in
over a dozen states, including Oregon, Mississippi, Indiana,
Virginia, and Colorado.60 Along with the growth of new supermax
prisons, the United States saw an increase of longer duration and
higher intensity solitary confinement practices throughout the
country.61
The growth of solitary confinement practices was not met
without concern.62 The Supreme Court in In re Medley expressed
doubt and concern over these practices in the early years of solitary
confinement development.63 In 1978, the Court in Hutto v. Finney
also acknowledged the importance of considering the duration and
conditions in determining the constitutionality of a sentence.64 More
recently, Justice Kennedy stated in a 2015 concurring opinion that
“[y]ears on end of near-total isolation exact a terrible price.”65
Despite being a leader of mass incarceration and punitive isolation
practices for decades, California also announced recent prison
reforms in solitary confinement, including significantly reducing
57. Id.
58. See Peterkin, supra note 19, at 826 (stating that a federal judge found
that there was no constitutional basis for shutting down the prison despite
finding that the conditions were borderline humanly tolerable and allowed for
the states to determine this for themselves). Pelican Bay Prison was also not
originally intended to house prisoners in insolation for decades. Id.
59. Sullivan, supra note 38.
60. Id. (noting that Colorado’s supermax facility was known as the “Alcatraz
of the Rockies”).
61. Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A
Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 477, 492 (1997).
62. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (stating that unnecessary pain can include physical and
psychological pain). Blackmun stated that the Court’s precedent did not support
psychological pain as being cognizable for constitutional purposes, but
nonetheless remarked that psychological pain can be more than de minimis,
which is what the Court’s precedent had said was not actionable under the
Eighth Amendment. Id. He analogized the quantification of pain and suffering
sustained from solitary confinement to that which we award for damages in the
tort context. Id.
63. In re Medley, 134 U.S. at 171.
64. Daniel H. Goldman & Ryan Brimmer, U.S. Supreme Court Cases,
SOLITARY WATCH, https://solitarywatch.org/resources/u-s-supreme-court-cases/
(last visited Apr. 24, 2020).
65. Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“[C]ommon side effects of solitary confinement include anxiety, panic,
withdrawal, hallucination, self-mutilation, and suicidal thoughts and
behaviors.”).
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the numbers detained in solitary, limiting how the practice will be
used in the future, and the maximum time a prisoner can be kept
in solitary.66 Former President Obama also demanded prison
reform in solitary confinement practices and stated that solitary
confinement “undercuts the second chance” engrained in our
country of opportunity.67 Moreover, the Association of State
Correctional Administrators (ASCA) and the Arthur Liman Center
for Public Interest Law at Yale Law School recently released an
article stating that the “[t]wo areas of special concern are the impact
of mental illness and the length of time individuals spend in
restrictive housing.”68 However, despite recognizing how damaging
isolation prison practices are, our courts have done little to regulate
the boundaries of solitary confinement use.69

B. International Views Against Solitary Confinement
The international community has expressed negative opinions
in response to the United States’ expanding solitary confinement
practices.70 Based on what has been voiced thus far, it would seem
the community believes that lengthy segregation sentences are

66. Reinert, supra note 48, at 940; see LISA GUENTHER, in HELL IS A VERY
SMALL PLACE: VOICES FOR SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 212 (Casella, et al. eds.,
2016) (describing solitary confinement practices in California and how
California violated a Supreme Court order “to address its prison overcrowding
crisis [but] produced conditions so intolerable that they violate the Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment”); see also, e.g., Key Reforms
to California’s Use of Solitary Confinement, PRISONERS WITH CHILD.,
www.prisonerswithchildren.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/PB-settlementsummary_short-version.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2019) (detailing some key
reforms to California’s solitary confinement practices, including not being able
to impose indeterminate solitary sentences, having prisoners enter into a stepdown program after serving their determinate sentence, capping the maximum
time spent in solitary at 10 continuous years, and allowing prisoners to monitor
compliance with the settlement agreement by meeting with California prison
officials to “review the progress of the settlement, discuss programming and
step-down program improvements, and monitor prison conditions”).
67. Obama, supra note 23.
68. YLS Today, ASCA and Liman Center Release Two New Reports on
Solitary Confinement, YALE L. SCH. (Oct. 10, 2018), www.law.yale.edu/ylstoday/news/asca-and-liman-center-release-two-new-reports-solitaryconfinement.
69. Reinert, supra note 48, at 941.
70. Juan E. Mendez, et al., Seeing into Solitary: A Review of the Laws and
Policies of Certain Nations Regarding Solitary Confinement of Detainees, WEIL
15, 22 (Sept. 2016), www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/2016/un_special_report
_solitary_confinement.pdf (stating that many of the surveyed nations had
statutory limits of approximately 30 days or less for solitary confinement as a
disciplinary sanction and at least half of the jurisdictions reviewed showed
improvement in amending or banning solitary practices).
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inhumane and cruel.71 For example, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights held that “prolonged isolation and coercive solitary
confinement are . . . cruel and inhuman treatments, damaging to
the person’s psychic and moral integrity and the right to respect of
the dignity inherent to the human person.”72 The European courts
have also held that long term, indefinite solitary confinement
constitutes degrading and inhumane treatment despite
extraordinary circumstances, and despite an inmate having some
access to the outside world.73 In addition, the European Court of
Human Rights stated that an inmate could not be held in isolation
“indefinitely.”74
In 2008, the United Nations characterized the “prolonged
isolation of detainees” as something that can constitute “cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and, in certain
instances, may amount to torture.”75 In August 2011, the U.N.
Special Rapporteur concluded that “any period of solitary
confinement in excess of 15 days” is considered as “prolonged
solitary confinement” because of the irreversible effects isolation
can have on a person at that point.76 The report also stated that
“negative health effects occur [after] only a few days in solitary
confinement, and the health risks rise with each additional day
spent in such conditions.”77 The Special Rapporteur concluded that
the “use of solitary confinement should be kept at a minimum, used
in very exceptional cases, for as short a time as possible, and only
as a last resort.”78 It also concluded that there should not be
71. Jules Lobel, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Litigating Under the
Eighth Amend.: Prolonged Solitary Confinement and the Const., 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 115, 122 (2008).
72. Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160,
¶ 323 (Nov. 25, 2006).
73. Lobel, supra note 71, at 125; see Ramirez Sanchez v. France, App. No.
59450/00, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 49, 128, 131 (2007), www.legal-tools.org/
doc/84b1ed/pdf/ (stating that prisoners had two hours of outdoor exercise, family
visits, one hour of indoor exercise, and recreational material).
74. Lobel, supra note 71, at 124.
75. Manfred Nowak (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), P 77, U.N. Doc. A/63/175
(July 28, 200).
76. Juan E. Mendez, (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), P 9, 22 U.N. Doc. A/66/268
(Aug. 5, 2011) (stating whether solitary confinement constitutes torture
depends on the circumstances and listing several scenarios that would be
especially problematic for international law); accord Smith, supra note 30, at
471 (indicating that studies on solitary confinement have shown that effects can
start within hours or a few days).
77. Mendez, supra note 70, at 17.
78. Id. at 4 (stating also that there should be “established safeguards in
place after obtaining the authorization of the competent authority subject to
independent review.”) Mendez implored for the prohibition of indefinite solitary
confinement as a judicially imposed sentence or disciplinary measure and for
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indefinite solitary sentences and that there should be determinate
max time a prisoner can be kept in solitary before it is deemed
“prolonged.”79
The U.N.’s Committee Against Torture (CAT) also reviewed
the United States’ practice of solitary confinement.80 CAT expressed
concern over isolating prisoners for long periods of time and the
effect such isolation has on their mental health.81 CAT addressed
its concerns by proposing that “the State party . . . review the regime
imposed on detainees in ‘supermax prisons,’ in particular the
practice of prolonged isolation.”82

C. Solitary Confinement Statistics in the United States
The United States still sees an increasingly wide-spread use of
solitary confinement practices across the country.83 A reported
twenty percent of federal and state prisoners, and eighteen percent
of local jail detainees spent time in solitary confinement.84 The
Bureau of Justice Statistics stated that approximately 81,000 men
and women were under solitary confinement between 2000 and
2005.85 Today, that number has increased to between 80,000 and
100,000 men and women, not including individuals housed in
juvenile facilities, immigrant detention centers, and jails.86
there to be “a maximum term or days beyond which solitary confinement is
considered prolonged. Id.; see Reinert, supra note 48, at 964 (noting that the
Special Rapporteur also endorsed the Istanbul Statement on the Use and
Effects of Solitary Confinement, where it concluded that solitary confinement
“should only be used in very exceptional cases, for as short a time as possible
and only as a last resort”).
79. Mendez, supra note 70, at 16.
80. Reinert, supra note 48, at 965.
81. Lobel, supra note 71, at 122-23.
82. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 36th Session, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions
and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: United States of
America,
CAT/C/USA/CO/2,
at
P
9
(May
19,
2006),
www.aclu.org/other/conclusions-and-recommendations-committee-againsttorture.
83. Haney & Lynch, supra note 61, at 491.
84. Reinert, supra note 48, at 928-29.
85. Peterkin, supra note 19, at 827 (stating that the census figures do not
account for inmates in juvenile facilities, immigrant detention centers, or local
jails who are in solitary confinement).
86. Terrence McCoy, When Solitary Confinement Becomes Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Jan. 30, 2016),
www.pressherald.com/2016/01/30/when-solitary-confinement-becomes-crueland-unusual-punishment (discussing the challenges with prison reform,
particularly for solitary confinement and noting how some facilities do not keep
records or disclose how often they isolate inmates); Solitary Confinement Facts,
AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., www.afsc.org/resource/solitary-confinementfacts (last visited Apr. 22, 2020).
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These numbers also are partially due to present systemic
prison issues.87 The nation is currently seeing unprecedented rapid
growth in the general prison population, resulting in extreme
overcrowding and management control issues.88 This growth has
led prison officials to resort to segregating and isolating the inmates
viewed as “troublesome.”89 This solution is especially used to
remove and confine prison gangs or those suspected of being gang
members.90 In effect, these prison officials have “driven the renewed
embrace of solitary confinement” because of their often first-resort
solution in isolating prisoners.91 Moreover, prison officials are given
wide deference and are shielded heavily against litigation through
legal tools such as the doctrine of qualified immunity.92 This
doctrine gives strong protection to governmental officials against
liability when performing discretionary functions so long as their
conduct does not violate a clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.93

D. Experimental Findings of Solitary Confinement
Science and research have played an integral role in the legal
discussion regarding the constitutionality and effects of solitary
confinement.94 Experiments performed on both animals and human
subjects have shown a strong correlation between adverse
psychological changes and increased time spent in isolation.95 More
importantly, these experimental results mimicked the findings
observed from inmates who were surveyed and interviewed about
their experiences while in solitary.96 These studies provide a crucial
insight into the toxic effects of this isolation practice and its
87. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 61, at 491 (discussing the rapid surge in
the general prison population and its effect on the facilities).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 492.
91. Reinert, supra note 48, at 937.
92. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (stating how
government officials are protected by qualified immunity from constitutional
violation liability if pled as an affirmative defense unless the situation fell under
certain limited circumstances).
93. Id. at 818.
94. Kirsten Weir, Alone, in ‘The Hole’, AM. PSYCHOL. ASSOC. (May 2012),
www.apa.org/monitor/2012/05/solitary (discussing the effects solitary
confinement has on mental health and how scientific research has been used to
better understand this issue).
95. See discussion infra Sections II.D.1-3 (discussing the experimental
results supporting such correlation).
96. Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH.
U.J.L. & POL’Y 325, 345 (2006), openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1362&context=law_journal_law_policy.
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irreversible effect on brain functioning.97
1. Animal Experiments
In the 1950s, Dr. Harry Harlow, an American psychologist who
dedicated his studies to understanding the effects of
companionship, human needs, and social isolation,98 stated that
human social isolation is a problem of “vast importance” with
deleterious effects.99 He conducted a famous experiment using
rhesus monkeys to understand these effects.100 The monkeys were
placed in a solitary chamber nicknamed “the pit of despair,” as it
was shaped like an inverted pyramid with slippery slides so that
climbing out was impossible.101 After a mere day or two, Dr. Harlow
reported that the monkeys underwent significant changes. He
stated that one could “presume at this point that [the monkeys]
[found] their situation hopeless.” Dr. Harlow found that monkeys
kept in isolation engaged in irregular behavior such as “rocking in
place for long periods” and “mutilating themselves.”102 The
experiment also found that the longer the monkey stayed in
isolation, the more severe the symptoms were – there was a direct
correlation between time and the effects.103 Monkeys who were
isolated for twelve months “almost obliterated the animals socially
. . ..”104 Dr. Harlow’s study provided important initial insight into
97. Id. at 347-48.
98. DEBORAH BLUM, LOVE AT GOON PARK: HARRY HARLOW AND THE
SCIENCE OF AFFECTION (2002).; Kendra Cherry, Biography of Psychologist
Harry Harlow, VERYWELLMIND, https://www.verywellmind.com/harryharlow-biography-1905-1981-2795510 (updated Mar. 23, 2020).
99. Harry F. Harlow, et al., Total Isolation in Monkeys, DEPT. OF PSYCH.
PRIMATE LAB. & REG’L PRIMATE RES. CTR. 90 (Apr. 28, 1965),
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC285801/pdf/pnas00159-0105.pdf
(stating that human social isolation causes effects that are “deleterious to
personal adjustment, normal heterosexual development, and control of
aggressive and delinquent behaviors”).
100. See generally Jason M. Breslow, What Does Solitary Confinement Do to
Your Mind?, PBS (Apr. 22, 2014), www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/whatdoes-solitary-confinement-do-to-your-mind (discussing the psychological effects
caused by solitary confinement, the experiments exploring these effects, and
their findings).
101. Id.
102. Id. (The experiment found that the isolated monkeys ended up being
“profoundly disturbed, given to staring blankly and rocking in place for long
periods, circling their cages repetitively, and mutilating themselves”).
103. Id. (stating that those that had been caged the longest were unable to
readjust). Monkeys held for three months in isolation had debilitating effects
that were reversible. Id. at 92. Isolation extending through the first six months
“severely impair[ed] the potentiality for socialization.” Id. at 93. The
researchers stated that they initially thought that 12 months of isolation would
produce no additional decrement, but they were proven false. Id. at 94.
104. Peterkin, supra note 19, at 829 (stating that twelve months of isolation
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the psychological effects isolation can have on living beings.105
In another animal experiment, Dr. Michael J. Zigmond,
Professor of Neurology at the University of Pittsburgh, stated that
there were neurological differences observed in an experiment
conducted in 2016 involving solitary confinement of laboratory
mice.106 In this research, some of the mice were placed in “shoebox
housing,” while other mice were placed in “enriched environments”
that allowed interaction with other mice and had “freer range of
movement and exercise equipment.”107 The study showed that the
mice in shoebox housing had “a measurable difference consisting of
simpler neurons, fewer connections between those neurons, and
fewer synapses in the brain compared to [the] socialized mice” in
the enriched environment.108 Dr. Zigmond’s experimental results
further supported what was observed in Dr. Harlow’s experiment
and exposed a finding of deleterious neurological effects on living
beings placed in isolation.109
2. Social Experiments on Humans
Social experiments were also performed to learn about the
effects of solitary confinement observed in humans.110 Though these
experiments are rare nowadays, the experiments in the 1950s gave
us a rare glimpse as to how solitary conditions actually affected
human subjects.111
almost obliterated the animals socially); see also Harlow, supra note 99, at 96
(stating that at 12 months, “the isolates were highly fearful and showed almost
no positive social behavior and no aggression”).
105. Id.; Harlow, supra note 99 and accompanying text; Breslow, supra note
100-104 and accompanying text.
106. Carol Schaeffer, “Isolation Devastates the Brain”: The Neuroscience of
Solitary Confinement, SOLITARY WATCH (May 11, 2016), solitarywatch.org/
2016/05/11/isolation-devastates-the-brain-the-neuroscience-of-solitaryconfinement/ (discussing the neurological effects of solitary confinement on the
human brain).
107. Id. The housing was set up to emulate the solitary housing
arrangements: some of the mice were put in stacks of small containers where
“[t]hey may be able to sense each other’s presence, but cannot see or interact in
any way,” while other mice were placed in a larger box which allowed mice to
freely interact with one another, emulating the general prison population. Id.
108. Id. Dr. Zigmond obtained special permission in order to conduct the
experiment because the animal care boards found “solitary housing [as]
unacceptable under express circumstances.” Id.
109. Schaeffer, supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
110. See sources cited infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text (discussing
the different experiments that tested the effects of solitary confinement on
humans).
111. Michael Mechanic, What Extreme Isolation Does to Your Mind, MOTHER
JONES (Oct. 18, 2012), www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/10/donald-o-hebbeffects-extreme-isolation/ (explaining the different experiments performed in
the 1950s investigating the effects of isolation on humans and noting how
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In 1951, Dr. Donald Hebb, a Professor of Psychology at McGill
University, conducted an experiment to study how sensory isolation
affects human cognition.112 His experiment applied extreme
isolation for six weeks to paid male graduate school students to see
what effects, if any, the isolation had on them.113 What he found was
that the majority of the subjects lasted no more than a few days in
isolation, and none lasted more than a week.114 Almost all of the
subjects reported similar experiences of being “unable to think
clearly about anything for any length of time” and experiencing
hallucinations, childish emotional responses, extreme restlessness,
and inability to perform grade-school tasks.115 This experiment was
crucial in showcasing the actual cognitive effects isolation has on
humans, rather than just animals.116
More recently, in 2008, clinical psychologist Ian Robbins
recreated Dr. Hebb’s experiment by isolating six subjects for 48hours in a sound-proofed room.117 Similar to the symptoms
experienced by the subjects in Dr. Hebb’s experiment, the Robbin’s
subjects also experienced psychological symptoms including
anxiety, extreme emotions, paranoia, and significant mental
impairment.118 This experiment further supported the idea that
isolation does indeed affect humans and those effects were able to
experiments like these are rare nowadays because of challenges in receiving
approval from the institutional review boards).
112. Id.
113. Id. Hebb paid male graduate students $20 a day to stay in small
chambers that were about a meter wide and a meter long. Id. The subjects were
not completely deprived of human interaction as they were given food and
escorted to the bathroom by humans. Id. The subjects all “wore goggles and
earphones and [had] some sort of noise, just white noise, from a loudspeaker.”
Id. The subjects also wore gloves and cardboard tubes over their arms to limit
their sense of touch, as well as a U-shaped pillow to cover their ears and block
any outside noise. Id. The theory was to block continuous sensory input to the
brain. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. The cognitive tests showed that the subjects’ mental faculties were
temporarily impaired. Id. The subjects were seen “arguing that supernatural
phenomena were real” despite not holding these beliefs when interviewed later.
Id. The subjects also sustained both visual and oratory hallucinations –
including seeing nothing but dogs, hearing a music box playing, hearing a full
choir while seeing a sun rising over a church, etc. Id. One also felt like his arm
was being hit by pellets fired “from a miniature rocket ship he saw . . ..” Id.
116. Id.
117. Michael Bond, How Extreme Isolation Warps the Mind, BBC (May 13,
2014), www. bbc.com/future/story/20140514-how-extreme-isolation-warpsminds (discussing the effects of isolation on the human mind in general, not just
in the prison setting, and how BBC conducted an experiment with Ian Robbins
to recreate the Hebb experiment).
118. Id. The volunteers also suffered hallucination, including seeing a “heap
of 5,000 empty oyster shells; a snake; zebras; tiny cars; the room taking off;
mosquitos; fighter planes buzzing around.” Id.
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manifest within a short period of time.119
Dr. Hebb’s and Dr. Robbins’ experiments provide us with
factual data as to the effects sensory deprivation and isolation have
on humans.120 This is important in allowing us to understand the
experiences and eventual psychological changes of inmates placed
in solitary confinement.
3. Observations of Inmates in Solitary Confinement
Studies have shown that solitary confinement can cause an
individual to become a greater danger to themselves.121 Inmates
living in isolation self-mutilate at a higher rate than those living in
the general prison population.122 Suicide is another big concern for
those in solitary confinement – one research study found that half
of all suicides that took place in prisons between 1999 and 2004
were from those in solitary confinement.123 A 2014 study showed
that half of the inmates who engaged in acts of self-harm or
potentially fatal self-harm, were inmates held in solitary
confinement, though only seven percent of those subjects surveyed
were in solitary.124
Stuart Grassian, a board-certified psychiatrist and faculty
member of Harvard Medical School, interviewed hundreds of
inmates who were placed in solitary confinement and found that a
third of them were “actively psychotic and/or acutely suicidal.”125 He
found that other symptoms manifesting from isolation included
“psychiatric syndrome, characterized by hallucinations; panic
attacks;
overt
paranoia;
diminished
impulse
control;
hypersensitivity to external stimuli; and difficulties with thinking,
and concentration and memory.”126
In addition, forensic psychiatrist Terry Kupers also
interviewed thousands of supermax prisoners in the United
States.127 Dr. Kupers found that the conditions of supermax cells
cause “great harm to individuals suffering from serious mental
119. Id.
120. See infra Section II.D.2 (discussing the experiments conducted by the
two doctors).
121. Breslow, supra note 100.
122 Id.
123. Id.
124. Fatos Kaba, et al., Solitary Confinement and Risk of Self-Harm Among
Jail Inmates, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (Mar. 2014), www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC3953781.
125. Kupers, supra note 12, at 213, 215-16.
126. Peterkin, supra note 19, at 831 (illustrating how inmates had crippling
obsessions, including one inmate who stood in front of a toilet for hours because
of his obsession with emptying out his bladder and wanting to feel like it was
completely empty).
127. Bond, supra note 118.
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illness [and] also cause great harm to those who are relatively stable
from a psychiatric perspective.”128 His findings also concluded that
prisoners who spent long periods of time in solitary confinement
exhibited anxious, paranoid, and angry behavior and had difficulty
with concentration, cognition, and memory.129
Moreover, based on his study on Pelican Bay Prison inmates,
psychologist Craig Haney found that these effects follow the
inmates after their release from solitary or prison – prisoners “lose
the ability to initiate or to control their own behavior, or to organize
their own lives.”130 Dr. Haney attributed these inabilities to the
complete lack of control the inmates experienced while in
solitary.131 His research showed that prisoners often experienced
“apathy, lethargy, depression, and despair . . . [and] [i]n extreme
cases, prisoners may literally stop behaving.”132
These studies provide important insight as to the psychological
and physiological effects solitary imprisonment truly has on current
inmates.133 Moreover, these effects were consistently present in
inmates throughout the different experiments.134

III. ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the various ways in which solitary
confinement claims have been litigated and how the courts in
different federal circuits have responded. This analysis begins by
examining the two legal channels commonly used by inmates in
lawsuits to challenge the issue of solitary confinement – the Eighth
128. Kupers, supra note 12, at 24-25.
129. Id. at 25. He observed that prisoners in solitary confinement
“deteriorate and become more psychiatrically impaired and less capable of
functioning back in the community.” Id. The prison systems structured
themselves in a way where “it is as if there is a wish to hide the damage wreaked
by years of solitary confinement” by putting prisoners who have completed their
prison terms in psychiatric hospitals or finding them guilty of a new, in-prison
crime because of his actions while being locked up in isolation. Id.
130. Breslow, supra note 100 (discussing the possibility for inmates to adjust
after being released).
131. Id. (stating that some inmates in solitary were found to “lose the ability
to initiate behavior of any kind – to organize their own lives around activity and
purpose”).
132. Id. (stating that some inmates were unable to interact with people after
they were given the opportunity to do so for the first time, that this was due to
being isolated in their cell, and which such isolation resulted in social atrophy).
“[T]he anxiety which surrounds social interaction can be extremely disabling
and problematic for people who are released from solitary confinement, either
released back into the larger prison community, or even more poignantly,
released from solitary confinement into the larger society.” Id.
133. See sources cited supra notes 122-134 and accompanying text
(discussing the effects observed on inmates in solitary).
134. Id.
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and Fourteenth Amendments. This analysis then examines the
legal protection afforded to defendants via the qualified immunity
doctrine. After laying the foundation upon which litigation is
commonly based, this analysis will discuss the recent rulings of the
different circuit courts in response to these claims. Furthermore,
this analysis will briefly discuss the circuit split on the issue of
whether a prison can deny inmates outdoor exercise without
violating the Eighth Amendment, and the general inadequacies of
mental health care for inmates in solitary confinement. Finally, this
analysis will conclude by discussing how the lack of prison
uniformity and insufficient mental health care, coupled together,
result in prison conditions that violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.

A. Litigating Solitary Confinement
Solitary confinement issues most commonly arise out of
Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims.135
Bringing a claim under either Amendment poses its own individual
challenges, as well as ruling differences among the circuit courts.136
Moreover, these plaintiffs must anticipate and be able to argue
against the defendant’s qualified immunity protection to be
successful in their claims.
1. Litigating Under the Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from having
their life, liberty, or property deprived without due process of law.137
An inmate must challenge the conditions of his confinement to
establish a due process violation by showing that the defendants
deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.138 A
liberty interest is deprived if the defendants “impose atypical and
135. See discussion infra Section III.A (discussing the challenges behind
litigating under the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment); see also
Karemet A. Reiter, The Most Restrictive Alternative: A Litigation History of
Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons, 1960-2006, 57 STUDS. IN L., POLS., &
SOC’Y
(2012)
84-85,
cloudfront.escholarship.org
/dist/prd/content/qt3db064tt/qt3db064tt.pdf (discussing the history of litigation
and how the expansion of habeas corpus rights, application of the Eighth
Amendment to state prisoners, and authorization of suits against prison
officials under the Civil Rights Act provided inmates with more tools to
challenge the constitutionality of their solitary confinement sentences).
136. Id.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
138. Steffey v. Orman, 461 F.3d 1218, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that
an inmate did not sustain an “atypical and significant hardship” where the
prison restricted his right to receive money from another inmate’s family
member).
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significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.”139
What qualifies as an “atypical and significant hardship” has
not been easy to define for prisoners wanting to litigate these
matters. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Wilkinson v. Austin stated
that a “baseline from which to measure what is atypical and
significant” has not been identified for any prison system.140 The
Court also found it unnecessary to define what “atypical and
significant hardship” entailed because the conditions sustained in
that particular case passed constitutional muster “under any
plausible baseline.”141 Since then, the Court has yet to clearly define
the appropriate baseline but has instead directed that question for
the lower courts to decide on their own.142 This decision has caused
the lower courts to use varying approaches to address the issue,
without any clear baseline in sight.143 Despite the divergent
approaches, the circuits are all in agreement that no procedures are
required before placing an individual in solitary confinement if for
a “short” period of time.144
Procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment
entitles inmates to know why they are placed in solitary
confinement, as well as an opportunity to rebut and be heard as to
why they should not be placed there.145 Some prisons allow inmates
to object before the final level of review as another layer of
protection against a potential erroneous deprivation of rights.146
Still, the Supreme Court has held that an inmate’s solitary

139. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
140. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223.
141. Id.
142. Reinert, supra note 48, at 941-42; see e.g., Williams v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't
of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 559-60 (3d Cir. 2017) (applying Sandin v. Conner and
Wilkinson v. Austin to guide the court as to what constitutes as an “atypical and
significant” hardship).
143. Reinert, supra note 48, at 941-42 (contrasting the different approaches
taken by the Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits in determining whether
placement in segregation is atypical and significant); see e.g.,
Grissom v. Roberts, 902 F.3d 1162, 1169-73 (10th Cir. 2018) (applying the
DiMarco four-factor test for the inmate’s Fourteenth Amendment claim).
144. Reinert, supra note 48, at 943 (stating that “short” can range from
thirty to one hundred days or longer and noting that fifteen days constitutes as
“cruel and inhuman treatment,” prohibited by international law as suggested
in the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture).
145. Id. at 943; see also Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223 (1864) (declaring that
“the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: Parties whose
rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may
enjoy that right they must first be notified.”); see also Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at
226 (stating that “our procedural due process cases have been consistently . . .
the most important procedural mechanisms for purposes of avoiding erroneous
deprivations).
146. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 226.
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confinement is constitutional despite finding that a liberty interest
exists for a prisoner.147
Even in instances where solitary confinement conditions are
considered “atypical and significant” by a court, minimal procedures
actually apply.148 Procedural due process is therefore unable to
regulate and protect inmates against long term or permanent
solitary confinements, the conditions experienced in solitary, or the
decision-making factors to determine which inmates are placed in
solitary.149
Individuals who choose to litigate their solitary confinement
claims can do so under the Fourteenth Amendment.150 However,
they should be aware that there are challenges because of the
Supreme Court’s undefined baseline for measuring “atypical and
significant hardship” and the varying opinions lower courts may
have in defining that baseline for a particular case.151
2. Litigating Under the Eighth Amendment
The Supreme Court held that “confinement in . . . an isolation
cell is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth
Amendment standards.”152 The Eighth Amendment prohibits the
infliction of “cruel and unusual punishment.”153 It is not surprising
that many constitutional claims regarding solitary confinement
arise under the Eighth Amendment in light of the extreme nature
of the practice.154 It has been argued that solitary confinement is a

147. Id. at 224-30 (applying the Mathews test and concluding that the
prison’s interest in prison management and prison guard safety outweighed the
process and the inmate’s liberty interest); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976) (establishing a balancing test to determine whether a prison
procedure is constitutional by assessing: (1) the private interest affected by the
government action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of an interest
because of the procedure used and the probable value of other or additional
procedural safeguards if any; and (3) the state’s interest); accord Perry v.
Swanson, No. 16-2444, slip. op. at 10 (1st Cir. Aug. 29, 2018) (applying the
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test).
148. Reinert, supra note 48, at 943.
149. Id. at 944.
150. See discussion supra Section III.A.1 (discussing the requirements and
challenges when litigating solitary confinement claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
151. Id.
152. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685; accord Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667
(1962) (holding that the Eighth Amendment is applied against the states by way
of incorporation because of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
153. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
154. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (striking down a
sentence for violating the Eighth Amendment for the first time in the Supreme
Court).
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breed of “cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment because (1) the conditions are typically horrid and (2)
sentence lengths can be excessively and arbitrarily long.”155 In
response, the courts have often focused on the physical conditions
sustained by the inmates in the cell, rather than the psychological
harm or the excessive use of solitary confinement in general when
dealing with claims arising under the Eighth Amendment.156
To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, inmates must
satisfy a two-pronged test established by the Supreme Court which
is comprised of an objective and a subjective component.157 The
objective prong requires a claimant to show that the challenged
condition deprived them of a “basic human need” or that the
conditions were a “substantial risk of serious harm.”158 The
subjective prong requires claimants to show that prison officials
acted with “deliberate indifference” in subjecting the inmate to
these conditions despite knowing the harm or risk of harm.159 There
are also additional considerations to this test — whether the
punishment is proportional to the prison’s interest, the length of the
incarceration, and whether the punishment transgresses our
“evolving standards of decency.”160
The difficulty of litigating under the Eighth Amendment lies in
the fact that courts need to balance the inmates’ constitutional
rights with the large deference the courts have historically provided
to prison officials.161 The tension between these two conflicting
interests was illustrated in Madrid v. Gomez, where a Northern
District of California court found that “[t]he Eighth Amendment
simply does not guarantee that inmates will not suffer some
psychological effects from incarceration or segregation” in
addressing the first prong.162 However, the court found the second
155. Peterkin, supra note 19, at 822.
156. Id.
157. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Laura Rovner, in HELL
IS A VERY SMALL PLACE: VOICES FOR SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 181 (Jean
Casella, et al. eds., 2016).
158. Rovner, supra note 157.
159. Id.
160. Reinert, supra note 48, at 944-45.
161. See Mikel-Meredith Weidman, The Culture of Judicial Deference and
the Problem of Supermax Prisons, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1523-24 (2004)
(stating that supermax prisons are seen as the “prison of the future” and that
the courts’ solution to resolving constitutional issues regarding solitary
confinement “provides a glimpse of the vulnerability of inmates’ constitutional
rights in the face of evolving prison practices”).
162. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1264 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating
also that a “severe reduction in environmental stimulation and social isolation
can have serious psychiatric consequences for some people” and that it was clear
the inmates in this case sustained psychiatric deterioration that “occurred in
correlation with placement” in solitary confinement). The plaintiffs here were
challenging the constitutionality of conditions they experienced while
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prong was satisfied as the prison officials acted with indifference
and “crossed the constitutional line” when they failed to provide
inmates with adequate health care,163 as well as “permitted and
condoned” the use of excessive force.164 However, the Gomez court,
like other courts, also stated that it had a limited role in Eighth
Amendment litigation and that courts should give discretion to
state officials.165 The rationale behind wide discretion is that policy
choices regarding prison officials are not for judicial review and is
instead an area for the legislative and executive branches of
government to handle.166 So long as the prison officials do not
violate the Constitution, they are entitled to operate the prisons
however they choose.167
3. Qualified Immunity Protection for Prison Officials
If the defendant, such as a prison official, raises a qualified
immunity defense, the inmate bears the burden of showing that “the
law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”168
Qualified immunity is a powerful tool the law affords to prison
officials against Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.169
Qualified immunity protects officials from civil liability so long as
their actions do “not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”170 The immunity is triggered when a law is not “clearly
incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison. Id. at 1155.
163. Healthcare includes medical and mental healthcare.
164. Id. at 1279.
165. Id. (stating, “[f]ederal courts are not instruments for prison reform, and
federal judges are not prison administrators. We must be careful not to stray
into matters that our system of federalism reserves for the discretion of state
officials.”).
166. Id. at 1262 (stating that these policy decisions are not for “judicial
review or concern unless the evidence demonstrates that conditions are so
extreme as to violate basic concepts of humanity and deprive inmates of a
minimal level of life’s basic necessities”).
167. Id.
168. Cf. Mitchell v. Miller, 790 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 2015) (applying the
“clearly established” test to determine whether a police officer’s actions violated
the Fourth Amendment and holding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that
it was clearly established that the officer’s conduct was unconstitutionally
unreasonable under the circumstances).
169. See, e.g., Grissom, 902 F.3d at 1174-75 (applying the qualified
immunity doctrine to the inmate’s Eighth and Fourteenth amendment claim
and holding that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because
the inmate had failed to show any clearly established law that would entitle
him to relief).
170. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (citations omitted); accord
Williams, 848 F.3d at 570 (stating that “a qualified immunity analysis looks
through the rearview mirror, not the windshield” and that the inquiry should
focus on the relevant law when the violation allegedly occurred).
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established” at the time of the suit.171
Qualified immunity has been so powerful that a court may rule
for the prison officials even in the face of precedent saying
otherwise, and after acknowledging the existence of a protected
liberty interest for the inmate.172 This cushy layer of legal protection
effectually allows prison officials to have wide deference to decide
how to handle “a volatile environment.”173 However, to balance this
wide deference and power, the courts have also required that
adequate procedural protections be provided to the inmates.174
Qualified immunity creates difficult hurdles for inmates
challenging the constitutionality of their solitary confinement.175
Inmates need to overcome the high standards required to raise
Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims and the added layer of
immunity that protects prison officials.176

B. Solitary Confinement Inconsistencies Among the
Courts
Recent cases have shown that our prison systems have not
wandered too far from when the Quakers first implemented
isolation-imprisonment practices.177 When combining the history of
solitary confinement with the high standards of establishing a claim
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, against the
defensive shield of qualified immunity, the end result tends to show
the courts siding with the prison officials over the inmates.178 The
171 See Lopera v. Town of Coventry, 640 F.3d 388, 396 (1st Cir. 2011) (stating
that “a finding that a right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation is sufficient to warrant a finding of qualified immunity”).
172. See Williams, 848 F.3d at 552-53 (applying qualified immunity doctrine
in a case where death row inmate was housed in solitary confinement without
meaningful review of continuing placement and holding that the prison officials
had qualified immunity). The court held that the past precedent the plaintiff
relied on was not sufficient to establish “clearly established law” because other
district court decisions ruled otherwise. Id. at 570-71.
173. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482 (holding that prison officials must be provided
“appropriate deference and flexibility . . . [in managing] a volatile
environment”).
174. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223 (holding that inmates be provided
proper procedural protections if they “impose[] atypical and significant
hardship on [an] inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”)
(citations omitted).
175. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text (discussing the
deference courts tend to give prison officials).
176. Weidman, supra note 161, at 1520 (discussing The Prison Litigation
Reform Act and how Congress joined the Supreme Court in limiting the courts’
involvement with regulating prison regulation and entitling prison officials
freedom to act in their deference without judicial oversight).
177. Peterkin, supra note 19, at 824.
178. See, e.g., Grissom, 902 F.3d at 1174 (holding in August of 2018 that the
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Supreme Court has generally given legislatures wide latitudinal
authority to decide what qualifies as a fair sentence for specific
conduct.179 The Court also left the question open for the lower courts
to wrestle with on what an appropriate baseline of “atypical and
significant” is.180
The Supreme Court’s open-ended approach has left the lower
courts trying to determine how long an inmate can constitutionally
be placed in solitary confinement.181 Some federal circuits have
adopted a somewhat bright-line baseline while others have adopted
more vague baselines that left procedural due process principles
effectively inapplicable to solitary confinement regulation.182
However, even in situations where an individual’s time spent in
solitary fell within the bounds of “atypical and significant,” and
therefore due process protections should be triggered, in reality very
limited procedures actually apply.183
The better legal vehicle to raise claims would arguably be
under the Eighth Amendment.184 However, federal courts have not
addressed definitively whether the Eighth Amendment protects
against permanent or long-term placement of an inmate in solitary
confinement without meaningful review of an inmate’s

prisoner did not overcome the defense of qualified immunity despite the inmate
showing that “a growing number of courts have concluded [that] denying the
basic human needs of social interaction and environmental stimulation can
violate the Eighth Amendment, especially when the deprivation lasts for
years”). Here, the court acknowledged those cases but held that those were four
district court decisions that were not from the same circuit and thus the
prisoner’s argument was not “clearly established law.” Id.; see also e.g., Perry,
No. 16-2444, slip. op. at 12 (holding in August 2018 that the defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity); contra Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 809-10
(9th Cir. 2009) (holding that an inmate’s Eighth Amendment right against cruel
and unusual punishment was violated when the prison official withheld
nutritionally adequate meals on a regular basis and was deliberately indifferent
to the obvious risk of harm).
179. Reinert, supra note 48, at 946-47.
180. Id. at 941.
181. Id. at 941-42.
182. Id. at 942-43; Compare Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 230-33 (2d Cir.
2000) (holding that no liberty interests are at stake if the solitary confinement
is 101 days or less, that liberty interests are at stake if duration is over 305
days, and that a claim would need evidence of psychological effects sustained to
show a liberty interest violation if between 101 and 305 days), with Wagner v.
Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1997) (analyzing how the prisoner could have
transferred to another prison and that the conditions in this solitary
confinement unit must be compared with the general population of this prison
or those of the general population of any prison in the state).
183. Reinert, supra note 48, at 943-44 (noting that due process is very
limited in its ability to regulate solitary confinement conditions and suggesting
the Eighth Amendment as the better vehicle for protection).
184. Id.
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placement.185 Federal courts have often found solitary confinement
to not be an Eighth Amendment violation despite years of empirical
data and clinical research proving with clear data that solitary
confinement causes extreme, irreversible psychological damage.186
This focus on physical, rather than psychological, harm appears to
be a trend among many courts.187 Even so, some courts, particularly
state courts,188 have also held that an individual with a mental
illness cannot be placed in long-term solitary confinement because
doing so would inflict serious psychological pain on these
individuals.189
While the courts slowly try to understand the constitutional
issues with solitary confinement, meanwhile thousands of
American inmates are losing their mental well-being with each
passing day that they spend in isolation.190 Thankfully, we have
seen some movement and positive results, mainly on the state level,
where a few prisons implemented reform.191 Assaults against staff
are at the lowest since 2006 after Colorado lowered the number of
people held in solitary confinement.192 New Mexico also has seen
more prisoners engaging in rehabilitation programs after cutting
the number of people in solitary confinement.193 Moreover, assaults
on staff have decreased after federal prisons lowered the use of
solitary confinement by 25 percent since 2012.194 As it stands now,
185. Lobel, supra note 71, at 117.
186. Id. at 119 (discussing how the federal courts recognize the psychological
implications solitary confinement has on the inmates but still ruling no Eighth
Amendment violation in most cases regardless).
187. Id. at 133-36 (providing examples where the federal courts seemed to
place a higher value and emphasis on physical harm rather than psychological
harm, such as the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which required the
inmate to have sustained a physical injury before bringing a federal civil action
for mental or emotional injury).
188. The Dangerous Overuse of Solitary Confinement in the United States,
ACLU
12-13
(Aug.
2014),
www.aclu.org
/sites/default/files/assets/stop_solitary_briefing_paper_updated_august_2014.p
df. States like New York and Colorado passed laws prohibiting the placement
of individuals with mental illness into solitary confinement. Id.
189. Id. at 120; see also, e.g., Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D.
Tex. 1999) (stating that “the severe and psychologically harmful deprivations of
its administrative segregation units are, by our evolving and maturing society's
standards of humanity and decency, found to be cruel and unusual punishment
[upon the mentally ill inmates]”).
190. See William Blake, in HELL IS A VERY SMALL PLACE: VOICES FOR
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 25-33 (Casella, et al. eds., 2016) (describing his
experience in solitary confinement as “a sentence worse than death” and how
he would have “certainly” committed suicide had he known that he would spend
25 years in solitary confinement).
191. Obama, supra note 23.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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the courts are still trying to determine how long someone can
constitutionally be kept in solitary confinement. Because there is no
clear baseline drawn, there is no per se circuit split among the
federal circuit courts.195 However, what we do see are some more
lenient circuits requiring less time to trigger a constitutionally
protected interest than other circuits.196 Moreover, we see these
circuits advising how we can change this systemic issue.197

C. Circuit Court Against Prolonged Solitary
Confinement Sentences
Recent decisions in the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits reflect a stronger concern than other circuits against
unconstitutionally long solitary confinement sentences.198
1. Second Circuit
In a case where the inmate alleged that he spent more than
two and a half years in continuous solitary confinement, the Second
Circuit Court, in Fludd v. Fischer, held that this “unbroken stretch,
substantially longer than 305 days, is sufficiently ‘atypical and
significant’ to establish a liberty interest.”199 Similarly in another
case, the court in Colon v. Howard held that the “duration of
[solitary] confinement is a distinct factor bearing on atypicality and
must be carefully considered . . .” and that “305 days . . . is a
sufficient departure from the ordinary incidents of prison life to
require procedural due process protections.”200 Moreover, though
there is no clear way to measure the severity of hardship in solitary
confinement, the Second Circuit stated that “305 days satisfies the
standard[s]” of where the durational line should be drawn.201
2. Fourth Circuit
In a Fourth Circuit case where an inmate was held in solitary
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See discussion infra Section III.C.2 (discussing how the Fourth Circuit
provided recommendations on how to address this issue).
198. See discussion infra Sections III.C.1-4 (discussing the different
holdings by various federal circuits less lenient towards prolonged durations in
solitary confinement).
199. Fludd v. Fischer, 568 F. App'x 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2014).
200. Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 231 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that there
are no “precise calipers to measure [the] severity of [solitary] hardship, but [the
court here] believes that wherever the durational line is ultimately drawn, 305
days satisfies the standard”).
201. Id.
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confinement for twenty years without any disciplinary infractions
during that period, the court in Incumaa v. Stirling rejected the
district court’s conclusion that the inmate had no liberty interest to
support a due process claim to “avoid[] the onerous conditions of his
confinement.”202 In other recent cases, despite some rulings in favor
of the defendants, the Fourth Circuit discussed its desire to move
away from indefinite-like sentences and suggested the Supreme
Court to “prescribe more rigorous judicial review of state statutes
and regulations governing prison confinement conditions.”203 In
Prieto v. Clarke, the Fourth Circuit also stated that because the
Supreme Court adopted an approach encouraging states to codify
their own policies regarding prison treatment and inmate
confinement, this led states “to codify procedures establishing very
restrictive confinement conditions.”204
202. Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 531 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that
because the inmate was held in solitary for 20 years, he had a “significant
private interest in leaving the restrictive conditions in the SMU and serving
some part of his remaining life sentence outside of solitary confinement”). The
court also discussed how “every aspect of [his] life [was] severely restricted and
his body [was] subjected to extraordinary intrusion on a regular basis. Id. at
534. It stated that there must be some periodic review of the inmate’s
confinement in solitary and found that the inmate’s “uncontested evidence”
showed that the Department’s confinement review was inadequate. Id. at 53435. The court established the general prison population as the baseline to
determine whether prison conditions constituted “atypical and significant
hardship” in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Id. at 529.
However, it noted that the “baseline for atypicality” determination is made on
a case by case basis. Id. at 527.
203. See Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 254-55 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that
six years in solitary confinement is “undeniably severe” and “dehumanizing”
and that the Supreme Court “could prescribe more rigorous judicial review of
state statutes and regulations governing prison confinement conditions” but has
refused to do so thus far); see, e.g., Depaola v. Va. Dep't of Corr., 703 F. App'x
205 (4th Cir. 2017) (affirming the summary judgment against the inmate and
adopting the reasoning presented by the district court’s Opinion); see also
DePaola v. Va. Dep't of Corr., No. 7:14CV00692, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132980,
at *28 (W.D. Va. Sep. 27, 2016) (stating that the prison’s “step-down procedure,”
where inmates get to gradually be introduced into the general population
through good behavior, “addresses and alleviates the isolating conditions and
indefiniteness . . . as distinguishing factors of ‘atypical and significant’
hardships presented by a prison’s long term segregation scheme”). This prison
allowed for inmates to change their status from solitary to general population
by participating in step-down procedures which provides “behavioral criteria for
the inmate to qualify for incremental reductions of restrictions and increases in
privileges.” Id. The court also notes that the “team assessment approach” and
“multi-level classification review procedures” are built into the Operating
Procedures to protect inmates from guards who may willfully deny an inmate
the ability to move through the step-down procedures away from segregation.
Id. at 29.
204. Prieto, 780 F.3d at 255 (noting that if the Court holds onto this
approach, due process claims, like Prieto’s, will fail despite the court finding the
conditions to be dehumanizing).
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3. Seventh Circuit
In Marion v. Colombia Corr. Inst., an inmate argued that his
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated after he
was placed in solitary confinement for over 200 days.205 In this case,
the Seventh Circuit stated that it previously held, in a number of
cases, “that a liberty interest may arise if the length of segregated
confinement is substantial and the record reveals that the
conditions of confinement are unusually harsh.”206 The court held
that Marion’s 240-day confinement in solitary was “significantly
longer than terms of segregation imposed in cases where [it] [had]
affirmed dismissal without requiring a factual inquiry into the
conditions of the confinement.”207
4. Eleventh Circuit
Similar to the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, the
Eleventh Circuit, in Quintanilla v. Bryson, held that it was
unconstitutional for an inmate to spend two years in solitary
confinement where there was a lack of meaningful periodic review
and without explanation as to his continual placement.208 Similarly,
in Magluta v. Samples, the Eleventh Circuit held that over 500 days
in solitary confinement, for the purpose of punishment and with
minimal periodic reviews, was unconstitutional.209 The court also
held in Williams v. Fountain that one year of solitary confinement
was sufficient to state a claim.210

205. Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2009).
206. Id. at 697-98; see also, e.g. Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 533 (7th
Cir. 1995) (holding that six months segregation is not “an extreme term” and
would not trigger due process rights alone).
207. Marion, 559 F.3d 693 at 689-99 (explaining that despite the 240 days
term, the court’s analysis requires scrutiny of the actual conditions of
segregation and that this approach is consistent with other sister circuits).
208. Quintanilla v. Bryson, 730 F. App'x 738, 744-45 (11th Cir. 2018).
209. Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing
how the district court failed to consider how the inmate was placed in solitary
confinement shortly after filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and how
he was placed in solitary again after a two month release in the general prison
population despite there being no security threat). The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the defendants would not be entitled to qualified immunity due
to the harsh conditions imposed by the officials on this particular inmate
compared to the other pretrial detainees or convicted prisoners. Id. at 1277.
210. Williams v. Fountain, 77 F.3d 372, 374 (11th Cir. 1996).
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D. Circuit Courts Finding Prolonged Solitary
Confinement Constitutional
In contrast to the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits, recent decisions in the First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits
found lengthy solitary confinement durations to be constitutional
and qualified immunity protections applicable to the defendants.211
1. First Circuit
In a case where an inmate was held in solitary for 600 days,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the confinement was
constitutional.212 Though the inmate was informed of the
administrative reviews regarding his solitary confinement
placement, he “was not involved in the review process and there was
no means of appealing the status review determinations.”213
Regardless, the court held that the defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity because the prison officials did not know the
precise requirements for placement review as the law was not
clearly established at the time.214
2. Eighth Circuit
In Ballinger v. Cedar Cty., the Eighth Circuit held that one
year in solitary confinement did not constitute as an “atypical and
significant hardship.”215 In so holding, the court reasoned that what
the inmate experienced in solitary confinement was not materially
different than other cases where the court denied finding a deprived
liberty interest.216 The court emphasized that it has “consistently
211. See discussion infra Sections III.D.1-3.
212. Perry v. Swanson, No. 16-2444, slip. op. at 10 (1st Cir. Aug. 29, 2018).
213. Id. at 4.
214. Id. at 12-13. The inmate argued that the law was clearly established
after the Supreme Court ruled in Wilkinson v. Austin that the “’informal,
adversary procedures’ required where an inmate’s interest in avoiding atypical
and significant hardship was at stake had to include some sort of meaningful
periodic review.” Id. at 13. The First Circuit responded by holding that
Wilkinson did not hold any standards for placement review and rather, the
Supreme Court gave prison officials broad discretionary authorities to manage
and maintain the prisons. Id.
215. Ballinger v. Cedar Cty., 810 F.3d 557, 562 (8th Cir. 2016).
216. Id. at 563; see Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
that 37 days in isolation did not violate an inmate’s Eighth Amendment or
Fourteenth Amendment rights); accord Orr v. Larkins, 610 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th
Cir. 2010) (holding that demotion to segregation without cause is
constitutional). The court denied the inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim, which
alleged that the prison officials worsened his mental illness. Id. The reasoning
was two-fold: the inmate did not claim that the prison officials delayed or denied
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held that a demotion to [administrative] segregation, even without
cause, is not itself an atypical and significant hardship.”217
3. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit recently ruled in favor of prison officials in
two cases. In Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, the court held
that 30 years in solitary confinement did not violate the Eighth
Amendment since the inmate did not prove the conditions caused
him psychological harm.218 More recently, the Tenth Circuit held in
Grissom v. Roberts that six years in solitary confinement did not
violate the inmate’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in
light of the qualified immunity protection applicable to the prison
officials in this case.219
As demonstrated by the examples in this section, the different
circuits seem split on how willing they are to push the durational
boundaries.220 The Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits
seem to lean towards allowing shorter amounts of time spent in
solitary confinement, while the First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit
him medical care, and he also received anti-depressants and anti-psychotic
medication. Id.
217. Ballinger, 810 F.3d 557, at 562.
218. Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 559 F. App’x. 739, 759 (10th Cir.
2014) (holding that it cannot focus on his thirty years of solitary confinement,
alone, without considering the reasons for his confinement and the continuation
of his solitary confinement). Silverstein claimed he developed anxiety disorder,
depression, sleep depravity, memory loss, and cognitive impairment, due to
social isolation and the lack of an environmental stimulation. Id. at 749.
Silverstein had committed a range of prison misconduct such as threatening a
staff member, making an escape by posing as a United States Marshal,
possessing a weapon, and assaulting staff members. Id. at 759. Though
Silverstein is no longer “as violent” as before, the court here held that his
“institutionally conforming conduct occurred when he was not with other
inmates” and that his low-risk rating was “based on his current housing were
he ha[d] no access to weapons or potential victims.” Id. at 760. The court also
stated that length of time in confinement is only one consideration in
determining whether an Eighth Amendment violation exists. Id. at 754. It
ultimately held that it would defer to the prison officials’ judgment in
determining whether they think it is best to keep Silverstein isolated in the
interest of security. Id. at 754-55. Moreover, the court stated that it could not,
with certainty, conclude that the symptoms he experienced were due to his
segregated confinement rather than due to “the mere fact of his length
incarceration itself or some other factor, such as age.” Id. at 758.
219. Grissom, 902 F.3d at 1166, 1175 (granting qualified immunity and
holding that the prison officials were entitled to it because there was no clearly
established law at the time to alert the officials that they were violating the
prisoner’s constitutional rights). Grissom was placed in segregation due to an
“alleged involvement in narcotics trafficking at the prison” and later sustained
three contraband violations. Id. at 1171-72.
220. See discussion infra Sections III.B., III.C (discussing the circuit split on
the issue of long sentences in solitary confinement).
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seem to allow shockingly long sentences.221 Despite this split, one
trend and issue common among them all is the absence of a firm
duration upon which to measure by.222

E. Tenth Circuit’s Split with Five Other Circuits on
Right to Outdoor Activity
In 2018, two cases petitioned for a writ of certiorari regarding
the issue of whether clearly established Eighth Amendment law
permits prison officials to permanently deprive a prisoner in
solitary confinement of outdoor exercise without a security
rationale.223 Though the Court denied certiorari in both cases, the
circuit split regarding whether these inmates can be deprived of all
outdoor activity still remains.224
Under the facts of both cases, the petitioners endured twentythree years of solitary confinement at the Colorado State
Penitentiary without access to outdoor recreational activity.225 The
Tenth Circuit held that prison officials were protected through
qualified immunity since they did not know they were violating the
Constitution, creating a split with five other circuits.226 Other
circuits held that a prison official may not even temporarily
withhold outdoor exercise without a legitimate security reason.227
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Apodaca v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139
S. Ct. 5; see also Lowe v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 5 (2018).
224. Id.
225. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Lowe v. Raemisch, No. 17-1289 (Mar.
9, 2018), www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-1284_8mjp.pdf; Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 2, Apodaca v. Raemisch, No. 17-1284 (Mar 9, 2018),
www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/171284/38308/20180309112929168_Apodaca%20Petition%20FINAL.pdf.
226. Apodaca, 864 F.3d at 1074, 1080 (holding that an 11-month deprivation
of outdoor exercise did not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation and the
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as they did not knowingly
violate the Constitution).
227. See Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that
“[s]everal factors combined to make outdoor exercise a necessity. [Solitary
confinement] prisoners were in continuous segregation, spending virtually 24
hours every day in their cells with only meager out-of-cell movement and
corridor exercise. Their contact with others is so minimal.”); accord Hernandez
v. Velazquez, 522 F.3d 556, 558-61 (5th Cir.2008) (per curium) (holding that the
inmate’s deprivation of outdoor exercise for thirteen months while in solitary
confinement was proper for security reasons due to gang violence and his
affiliation with a prison gang); accord Walker v. Minzes, 771 F.2d 920, 927-28
(6th Cir. 2016) (agreeing with the district court’s ruling that withholding
outdoor time for a year violated the Eighth Amendment and remanding for
clarification on its orders regarding different minimum outdoor time depending
on prisoner classification); accord Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir.
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The idea was that outdoor exercise is “extremely important to the
psychological and physical wellbeing of the inmates.”228
Responding to the Court’s denial of certiorari, Justice
Sotomayor wrote a statement expressing her deep concerns
regarding solitary confinement.229 She wrote that it is “clear . . . that
. . . to deprive a prisoner of any outdoor exercise for an extended
period of time in the absence of an especially strong basis for doing
so is deeply troubling — and has been recognized as such for many
years.”230
As the Supreme Court denied hearing these cases, the issue is
still left to be resolved.231 Until the Court speaks on this issue, the
circuits will likely remain split.232

F. Lack of Adequate Mental Health Care
Mental health care provided to inmates is often inadequate.233
Mental health services for inmates in solitary confinement are
limited to dispensing psychotropic medication, a health care
clinician stopping at the cell front to ask how the inmate is doing,
and occasional private sessions.234 Inmates are typically not
provided individual therapy, group therapy, recreational or lifeskill-enhancing activities, and other forms of therapies due to
insufficient resources and the nature of solitary confinement.235
Additionally, prisons lack qualified medical staff and programs to
support the number of prisoners that require mental health care.236
2001) (holding that denying the inmate one year of outdoor exercise was proper
where there are security reasons in light of the inmate’s history of attacking a
prison guard); accord Bass v. Perin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1315-17 (11th Cir. 1999)
(recognizing that there is “a significant difference between some time outside—
even a minimal amount—and none at all” and holding that the Eighth
Amendment was not violated in light of security purposes due to the inmates
having murdered a prison guard and attempted to escape).
228. Spain, 600 F.2d at 199.
229. See Debra Cassens Weis, Sotomayor Expresses ‘Deeply Troubling
Concern’ About Solitary Confinement in Cert Denial, ABA J. (Oct. 9, 2018),
www.abajournal.com/news/article/sotomayor
_deeply_troubling_solitary_confinement (noting that denying prisoners “even a
moment in daylight for months or years” is a “deeply troubling concern”).
230. Id.
231. See discussion supra III.E (discussing the circuit split on the issue of
requiring outdoor activity for inmates in solitary confinement).
232. Id.
233. See discussion infra Section III.F (discussing the inadequacies of the
mental health care provided to inmates in solitary).
234. Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental
Illness in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 104, 105 (2010), jaapl.org/content/jaapl/38/1/104.full.pdf.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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Indeed, 22 out of 44 surveyed state prisons reported that they did
not have adequate mental health staff.237
Despite prisons offering some form of mental health care to
inmates, care is sometimes provided by untrained non-medical
staff.238 In a 2016 Wisconsin study, 26 out of 65 respondents claimed
that “they [had] medications or medical devices withheld or
threatened to be withheld by security staff who distribute[d]
prescriptions.”239 Former Wisconsin prison psychologist Bradley
Boivin stated that solitary confinement “wasn’t about correction at
all . . . it was about perpetual punitive behavior.”240 He believed that
the “drive-by” check-ins were insufficient to provide mental health
care and that they “[did not] provide the opportunity for the
clinician to address any psychological issues, any risk, in any
meaningful way.”241 Dr. Boivin also stated that “medical delivery by
non-health care staff is recognized on a national level as an unsafe
practice.”242 Due to these and many additional reasons, Dr. Boivin
resigned from his position as a prison psychologist because he could
not contribute to this type of prison practice anymore.243
Conflicts relating to dual loyalty is another issue in prison
mental healthcare.244 Health professionals often find themselves
trying to serve the interest of their patients, while also abiding by
the rules of the correctional facility.245 These prisons impart
pressure on medical professionals to “incorporate security concerns
into their clinical decision making[,] . . . [which] creates the
potential for erosion of meaningful clinical care and turning a blind
eye to neglect and abuse.”246
237. Id.
238. See id(discussing how untrained staff typically provide mental health
care).
239. Alexandra Arriaga, Wisconsin Inmates Report Despair, Little
Counseling in Solitary Confinement That Can Stretch on for Years, WIS. WATCH
(Apr. 15, 2017), www.wisconsinwatch.org/2017/04/wisconsin-inmates-reportdespair-little-counseling-in-solitary-confinement-that-can-stretch-on-for-years/
(providing accounts from inmates who alleged that prison officials withheld
medication from them).
240. Id.
241. Id. Boivin stated that the brief encounters are “the only routine clinical
contact inmates in solitary confinement receive” and that he received
“pushback” from security when he tried to set up one-on-one sessions with the
inmates. Id. He called the practice “inadequate” in that there is “no way to
gather information about a person’s mental health condition … in two or three
minutes . . ..” Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Jörg Pont, et al., Prison Health Care Governance: Guaranteeing
Clinical Independence, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (Apr. 2018), www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC5844391/.
245. Id.
246. Memorandum from the Conn. Advisory Comm. to the U.S. Comm’n on
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Mental health services are still extremely inadequate despite
some improvements and changes seen through the efforts of
litigation.247 However, this is also attributed to tight prison budgets
and minimal public backing for investments in prisoner mental
health treatments.248 The health professionals struggle to provide
adequate care due to the lack of resources, support, and large
caseloads.249
The current mental health care provided in prisons is
inadequate to address the high needs of those placed in solitary
confinement.250 Changes need to be made in order to combat the
detrimental psychological effects that isolation has on these
individuals.251

G. Consequences Resulting from the Lack of Clear,
Prescriptive Durational Guidelines and Adequate
Mental Health Care
The Supreme Court’s decision in allowing the lower courts to
determine where to draw the constitutional baseline for durations
in solitary confinement has led the courts to arbitrarily decide that
certain lengths of time are considered “unconstitutional,” while that
same length of time would be considered as “constitutional” in
another court.252 Providing such broad strokes of power to the lower
courts threatens two very central aspects to an individual living in
the United States: a prisoner’s constitutional rights and his mind.253
The Supreme Court’s decision to not prescribe durational
Civil Rights to U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights (Dec. 20, 2017).
247. Metzner & Fellner, supra note 235.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Terry Kupers, in HELL IS A VERY SMALL PLACE: VOICES FOR
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 169 (Casella, et al. eds., 2016) (stating that “a growing
proportion of prisoners suffer[ing] from serious mental illness has not led to
proportional enrichment of prisons’ mental health treatment capacities”).
251. Id. at 174 (asserting that rather than isolating problematic prisoners,
a “richer collaboration between security and treatment staff is needed” to help
develop a tailored plan in addressing the prisoner’s problematic behavior).
252. See Williams v. Fountain, 77 F.3d 372, 374 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding
one year in solitary confinement triggered a liberty interest); but see Smith v
Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that seven months in
solitary confinement did not implicate a liberty interest); but see also
Silverstein, 559 F. App’x 739, 759 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that 30 years in
solitary confinement was constitutional).
253. See generally Jodi Lessner, A Cruel and Unusual Burden: The Case for
the Unconstitutionality of Solitary Confinement, COLUM. UNDERGRADUATE L.
REV. (Nov. 19, 2017), blogs.cuit.columbia.edu/culr/2017/11/19/a-cruel-andunusual-burden-the-case-for-the-unconstitutionality-of-solitary-confinement
(discussing the harmful effects of solitary confinement and the absence of court
rulings holding the practice to be unconstitutional).
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standards for solitary confinement creates a fundamental issue
under the Eighth Amendment for lower courts to deal with.254
Allowing an open-ended, potentially decades-long, placement in
segregation deprives inmates of basic human needs and subjects
them to conditions that create a substantial risk of harm, satisfying
the first prong to the Eighth Amendment test.255 Research strongly
proves that solitary placement has deleterious and potentially
irreversible effects on the human mind.256 It has also shown that
the longer an individual remains in isolation, the more permanent
the damage.257 This research is also heavily corroborated by the
many first-hand accounts from inmates who experienced solitary
confinement.258
The second prong to the Eighth Amendment test is satisfied
through the continued use of prolonged solitary confinement
without much meaningful review (or repercussion for lack of
meaningful review) and the insufficient mental health care
provided to inmates despite robust findings of self-harm and other
mental health issues.259 This is a “deliberate indifference” to what
science has already proven yet is continuously ignored by the
correctional facilities.260
For these same reasons, solitary confinement practices without
clear durational boundaries violate the Fourteenth Amendment by
creating an “atypical and significant hardship” on inmates as the
254. Reinert, supra note 48, at 941.
255. Metzner & Fellner, supra note 234, at 105 (stating that “[s]uicides occur
disproportionately more often in segregation units than elsewhere in prison”
and that “many [mentally ill prisoners] simply will not get better as long as they
are isolated”).
256. Id. at 104 (“Isolation can be psychologically harmful to any prisoner,
with the nature and severity of the impact depending on the individual, the
duration, and particular conditions . . . Psychological effects can include anxiety,
depression, anger, cognitive disturbances, perceptual distortions, obsessive
thoughts, paranoia, and psychosis.”).
257. Breslow, supra note 100.
258. See, e.g. Coffey, supra note 11 (detailing the physical and psychological
harm inflicted on John Jay Powers after being placed in solitary). Powers was
serving a sentence for a bank robbery and had no mental illness prior to
incarceration. Id. at 17-18. He was placed in solitary confinement for 60 months
due to a prison infraction. Id. at 17. While in solitary confinement, Mr. Powers
“amputated his testicle and scrotum, bit off two fingers, tattooed his entire body,
and repeatedly attempted suicide. Id. at 18. Despite this behavior, a supermax
psychologist determined that he did not have an active mental disorder and was
not in need of treatment or an alternative custody arrangement.” Id.
259 . See Kupers, supra note 250 (discussing how psychotropic medications
are ineffective when the inmate is confined to a cell as the clinician has little
chance to develop a therapeutic relationship and to teach the inmate about his
mental condition and the need for medication).
260. See discussion, supra Section III.A.2 and sources cited (discussing the
difficult of litigating under the Eighth Amendment and needing to show
“deliberate indifference”).
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deleterious effects on the mind start the moment they are placed in
isolation and increase in severity in correlation with time.261 Indeed,
“[n]early every scientific inquiry into the effects of solitary
confinement over the past 50 years has concluded that subjecting
an individual to more than 10 days of involuntary segregation
results in distinct sets of emotional, cognitive, social, and physical
pathologies.”262 The effects of an inmate being placed for years
without any cut off point will undoubtedly exacerbate these health
issues.263
Moreover, enforcing solitary confinement without adequate
mental health care or required outdoor exercise further implicates
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment in light of what we know
about how solitary confinement affects the human mind.264 If
prisons are going to place inmates in solitary confinement for
security purposes, then they must do so in a way that does not cause
serious mental illness.265 Taking proper steps to care for an inmate’s
mental health creates a higher likelihood of rehabilitating and
reintegrating the prisoner back into the general prison population,
which in turn decreases security risk and makes the prisons safer
overall.266
Prison officials may argue that there are genuine reasons to
place one in solitary.267 The main arguments in support of solitary
confinement include inmate and officer safety, punishment with the
goal of changing behavior, and punishment for infractions.268
Nonetheless, even if an individual is placed in solitary for legitimate
reasons, there must be effective legal safeguards in place to protect
inmates from systemic abuses and from wholly losing one’s
constitutional rights and mental well-being.269 Otherwise, these
261. See Dana G. Smith, Neuroscientists Make a Case Against Solitary
Confinement,
Sci.
Am.
(Nov.
9,
2018),
www.scientificamerican.com/article/neuroscientists-make-a-case-againstsolitary-confinement/ (describing how “the brain is shaped by its environment”
and stating that the conditions of solitary confinement is “bad for brain
structure and function”).
262. Kenneth L. Appelbaum, American Psychiatry Should Join the Call to
Abolish Solitary Confinement, 43 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 406, 410
(2015), jaapl.org/content/43/4/406 (quoting David H. Cloud, et al., Public Health
and Solitary Confinement in the United States, 105(1) (AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 18,
21 (2015).
263. Grassian, supra note 96.
264 See discussion supra Sections II.D.1-3 (discussing the different studies
performed to understand the effects of isolation).
265. See discussion supra Section II.D.3 (discussing effects observed on
inmates in solitary).
266. Obama, supra note 23.
267. Hernandez, 522 F.3d at 558-61.
268. Appelbaum, supra note 262, at 407.
269. Eleanor Umphres, Current Development 2016-2017: Solitary
Confinement: An Unethical Denial of Meaningful Due Process, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL
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constitutional protections are rendered useless in effect.270
Prisons may also argue that an increase in medical care and
administrative requirements could lead to incurring higher costs
that the prisons cannot bear.271 In reality, it costs more to keep
prisoners in solitary than in general population prisons.272 This is
mainly due to increased staffing costs, as well as higher costs
needed to construct supermax prisons than other types of
facilities.273 Moreover, costs alone cannot justify denying
constitutional rights to individuals.274 If prisons are going to use
long-term isolation practices despite other rehabilitating and
deterring prison practices available, then they must reform their
practices so as to not deprive inmates of their foundational rights
and mental well-being.275
The issue for inmates in solitary confinement is that there are
no clear durational boundaries.276 The federal circuit courts are
split on how much discretion should be afforded to prison officials
when determining the proper amount of time.277 When we combine
this durational ambiguity with no mandatory outdoor activity,278
inadequate mental health care,279 and challenges in litigating
claims against these practices,280 what we see as a result are
prisoners sustaining increasingly detrimental and irreversible
psychological and neurological effects without any true voice to fight
against this.281

ETHICS 1057, 1083 (2017).
270. Id.
271. Metzner & Fellner, supra note 234.
272. Johnson, supra note 6 (noting that the cost of keeping an inmate in
solitary is three times as much as putting someone in a regular prison unit).
273. Sal Rodriguez, Fact Sheet: The Hight Cost of Solitary Confinement,
SOLITARY WATCH (2011), solitarywatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/factsheet-the-high-cost-of-solitary-confinement.pdf.
274. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (holding that
federal courts are required to provide counsel to individuals who cannot afford
one).
275. Metzner & Fellner, supra note 234, at 107.
276. See discussion supra Section III.C., III.D (discussing the circuit split on
duration).
277. Id.
278. See discussion supra Section III.E (discussing the circuit split on
requiring outdoor activity).
279. See discussion supra Section III.F (discussing lack of adequate mental
health care).
280. See discussion supra Section III.A (discussing litigating under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment).
281. See discussion supra Section III.D.2 (discussing the circuits lenient
towards prolonged sentences in solitary confinement).
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IV. PROPOSAL
Solitary confinement violates both the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ protections afforded to inmates.282 Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court has not abolished the practice of solitary
confinement on these two bases. This Comment advocates that if
correctional facilities are to continue solitary confinement practices,
then they must do so in a way that does not violate the inmates’
constitutional rights.
This Comment proposes that this issue can be resolved in three
ways. The Supreme Court can: (1) establish a clear durational limit
as to how long a person can be held in solitary confinement; (2)
mandate prisons to provide a minimum of one-hour outdoor activity
to inmates in solitary confinement absent legitimate security
justifications, subject to meaningful periodic review; and (3)
mandate prisons to provide adequate mental health care to
individuals in solitary confinement. If our Court chooses to stay
silent in this matter, then this Comment proposes that Congress
create laws that will draw boundaries for these prisons.283 These
recommendations benefit correctional facilities by decreasing
overall prison costs, considering the high costs of keeping an inmate
in solitary confinement as compared to an inmate held in the
general prison population.284

A. Establishing Durational Limits
No clear durational limits around solitary confinement have
been set.285 Instead, courts rule differently amongst themselves and
even at times, ambiguously even within the circuit.286 The Supreme
Court has shirked from addressing this issue head-on.287 The Court
needs to establish these boundaries for the lower courts. In the past,
the Supreme Court protected prison inmates’ constitutional rights
by creating institutional boundaries.288 We saw this when the

282. See discussion supra Section III.G (discussing the consequences
resulting from not having clear durational boundaries in line with the
Constitution and lacking adequate mental health treatment to combat the
psychological issues observed in inmates in solitary confinement).
283. This discussion is outside the scope of this Comment.
284. Johnson, supra note 6.
285. See discussion supra Sections III.B-C (discussing how the courts have
disagreed on what the durational boundaries should be).
286. Id.
287. See supra note 166-68 and accompanying text (discussing how the
courts avoided providing clear instructions and have instead given wide
discretion for lower courts to decide for themselves).
288. See infra notes 289-91 (discussing instances where the Supreme Court
created clear durational standards to prevent Constitutional violations).
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Supreme Court ruled that 48 hours post-arrest is the maximum
time limit before a person is entitled to have a Gerstein Hearing
and that two weeks is the maximum time that an individual
released from custody can be free from police interrogation before
being approached again.289 Indeed, in 2005, Justice O’Connor’s
dissent in Roper v. Simmons clearly acknowledged the need for
clear boundaries when she stated, “[C]lear, predictable, and
uniform constitutional standards are especially desirable” when it
comes to the Eighth Amendment.290
The Court should similarly set clear boundaries for the lower
federal courts and the states to follow. The liberty interests at stake
here reflect the same concerns the Court previously had in those
cases.291 However, even greater risks are at stake here – the
sanctity of the human mind and spirit. Social and scientific research
has already heavily proven that solitary confinement causes
irreversible, adverse neurological and mental effects which become
more severe with time.292 Courts have continued to acknowledge
these effects.293 For example, a 2019 concurring opinion from the
289. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (holding
that providing “judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of
arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of
Gerstein . . . [and] will [allow such jurisdictions to] be immune from systemic
challenges”). The Court notes that a probable cause determination does not
“pass[] constitutional muster simply because it is provided within 48 hours.” Id.
A hearing may still violate Gerstein if the arrested individual can prove that
probable cause determinations were unreasonably delayed. Id. More
importantly, the Supreme Court noted that “[w]here an arrested individual does
not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, the calculus
changes.” Id. at 57. The government bears the burden to show “bona fide
emergency or other extraordinary circumstance[s]” resulting in the delay. Id.;
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 117 (2010) (holding that Shatzer’s break in
Miranda custody between the first and second attempts at interrogation lasted
for more than two weeks, and therefore statements made thereafter were not
subjected to mandate suppression). In its analysis, the Supreme Court looked
at the timeline as to when the defendant made incriminating statements after
a break in custody. Id. at 111. The Court determined that when a defendant
“has been out of custody for two weeks before the contested interrogation, the
court is spared the fact-intensive inquiry into whether he ever, anywhere,
asserted his Miranda right to counsel.” Id. at 111-12.
290. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 594 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
291. See Riverside, 500 U.S. at 58 (noting that “the police should make every
attempt to minimize the time a presumptively innocent individual spends in jail
. . . [by providing] a judicial determination upon completing the administrative
steps incident to arrest . . .”).
292. See discussion supra Sections II.D (showing the different experiments
used to study the effects of isolation).
293. See, e.g., Grissom, 902 F.3d at 1176, 1179 (Lucero, J., concurring)
(discussing solitary confinement’s “significant toll on the human psyche,”
labelling its psychological effects as “devastating,” and stating that “[g]iven the
severe consequences of long-term placement in solitary confinement, such
conditions must be treated as a last resort, used in only the most extreme of
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Tenth Circuit recognized the effects of solitary confinement as
“devastating” and stated that “social interaction, environmental
stimulation, and activity are basic human needs . . . [and]
[d]eprivation of these needs for an extended period causes severe
and lasting consequences to mental and physical health.”294 The
Supreme Court should, as it has done in the past, create bright-line
durational boundaries for the states to follow to avoid any further
deprivation of inmate rights.
This Comment proposes that the Court adopt a maximum time
period of fourteen days for solitary confinement. Fourteen days will
fall in line with the fifteen-day period in which irreversible effects
take hold on a person’s mind, as stated by the United Nations’ 2011
Special Rapporteur Report.295 It also creates a clear boundary for
states to follow or to modify in accordance with their own state
constitutions — they either set the boundary at fourteen days or
provide more protection and require a shorter maximum time.296
After the fourteen-day period, inmates must be released to the
general prison population.
To ensure that prison officials do not attempt to release
inmates only to immediately place them back into solitary
confinement, there should also be a fourteen-day grace period in
which an inmate may not be returned into solitary confinement
absent exigent circumstances, such as true security reasons or
immediate harm to self or others.297 The prisoner must be afforded
a hearing in which the confinement should be reviewed every three
days within the fourteen-day period. This ensures that the prisoner
will be provided adequate Fourteenth Amendment procedural
protections.298
This Comment also advocates that correctional facilities
should implement a program for individuals in solitary confinement
that is actually aimed towards rehabilitation rather than
cases. And even then, prison officials must meaningfully consider on a periodic
basis whether solitary remains necessary . . .”).
294. Id. at 1176.
295. Mendez, supra note 70, at 9.
296. See Paul Marcus, State Constitutional Protection for Defendants in
Criminal Prosecutions, WM. & MARY L. SCH. SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 151,
153
(1988),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1774763
(stating that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “a state is free as a
matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those
this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards”).
297. Cf. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 117 (stating that a 14 day break from custody
would prevent the police from releasing an interrogated suspect who invoked
his Miranda right to counsel only to bring him back almost immediately for
reinterrogation – an abuse of police power).
298. Reinert, supra note 48, at 943-44; see supra note 146-47 and
accompanying text (discussing the necessity and importance of procedural due
process protection).

2020]

Buried Alive

277

punishment.299 More than 30 states have developed “step-down” or
“incentive” programs that gradually provide more prison “rights,”
such as access to television or a crossword puzzle, as the inmate
progresses through the program from solitary to a lower-security
status through good behavior.300 Prisons that have already
implemented these programs have experienced decreased rates of
segregation and lower incidents, such as physical assault, rapes,
and small-rule breakings.301 These programs should be
implemented in every correctional facility that practices solitary
confinement, with the goal of assimilating the prisoner back into
the general population. As previously stated, this would also help
prisons to decrease costs.

B. Requiring Minimum One Hour Recreational Activity
This Comment proposes that the Supreme Court mandate
access to outdoor activity for all individuals in solitary confinement.
Five other federal circuits have previously held that prison officials
cannot temporarily deny outdoor exercise from individuals in
solitary confinement absent security justifications.302 The Supreme
Court should reject the Tenth Circuit holding allowing for full
denial of outdoor exercise without any security justification.303 In
denying the grant of certiorari to two cases in 2018, the Court
denied the nation another critical opportunity to address this
serious issue.304
Providing outdoor exercise can help improve the negative
psychological effects of solitary confinement.305 Neuroscientist
Huda Akil stated that being deprived of social interaction and
sunlight can have an impact on the brain’s hippocampus and cause
depression and other medical conditions.306 Harvard Health
Publishing recently stated that “[r]esearch . . . has shown a strong
299. See generally Maurice Chammah, How to Get Out of Solitary — One
Step
at
a
Time,
THE MARSHALL PROJECT
(Jan.
7,
2016),
www.themarshallproject.org/2016/01/07/how-to-get-out-of-solitary-one-step-ata-time (providing examples of step programs designed to “motivate prisoners to
demonstrate appropriate behavior”).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302 See discussion supra Section III.E (showing that other than the Tenth
Circuit, five other circuits have held that outdoor recreational activity should
be required for inmates held in solitary).
303. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth
Circuit’s ruling and the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court).
304. Id.
305. Spain, 600 F.2d at 199.
306. Elizabeth Landau, Solitary Confinement: 29 Years in a Box, CNN (Jun.
9,
2015),
www.cnn.com/2014/02/23/health/solitary-confinementpsychology/index.html?hpt=hp_c2.
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connection between time spent in nature and reduced stress,
anxiety, and depression."307 In addition, requiring a security
justification allows for correctional facilities to still have a right to
withhold outdoor exercise in the face of a reasonable and important
justification — officer security.308 To prevent misuse of a security
justification and to still afford protection to the inmate, this
justification must be reviewed by upper-level prison management
every week to determine whether the security threat is still present.
It would also be best for management to work with the mental
health team to determine the severity of this security threat as well.
The Supreme Court needs to reconsider the severity of these
issues, understand how human lives are slowly deteriorating as
these cases do not get their rightful day and ruling in court, and
adopt the practices of the other five Circuits. Moreover, this
Comment pleads for the Supreme Court to view this issue as their
fellow bench member, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, sees it: that solitary
confinement is an extremely troubling issue and that its implication
“clutches a wide range of psychological scars.”309

C. Providing Adequate Mental Health Care
Adequate mental health care should be mandated for every
individual in solitary confinement, considering the severe effects
the practice has on the human mind. The challenge is to clearly
define what “adequate” entails. This Comment proposes that truly
adequate mental health care should include available one-on-one
private counseling sessions, available group counseling sessions,
and providing proper training to staff.
The current “drive-by” mental health care provided to prison
inmates in solitary confinement is grossly insufficient.310 Such
mental care would be ineffective for an ordinary individual, let
alone an individual suffering from a mental health disease who is
physically isolated for at least 23 hours a day. The quality of the
therapist-prisoner interaction needs heavy improvement.
Correctional facilities need to provide one-on-one time with a
307. Sour Mood Getting You Down? Get Back to Nature, HARV. HEALTH
PUBL’G (July 2018), www.health.harvard.edu/mind-and-mood/sour-moodgetting-you-down-get-back-to-nature (noting that people under high levels of
stress cause “malfunctions” in their brain that results in a “continuous loop of
negative thoughts” and that individuals who had outdoor exercise “had lower
activity in the . . . brain region that is active during rumination . . .”).
308. See supra note 227 and accompanying text (discussing how officer
security is still reasonable in denying an inmate recreational activity).
309. Weis, supra note 229.
310. See Arriaga, supra note 239 and accompanying text (quoting and
discussing the short and inadequate attention inmates receive in their mental
health care).
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therapist, in a room, outside of the cell. Private sessions allow
inmates a safe space to express themselves fully and allow
therapists to truly get to know the person in order to understand
how to tailor the mental health treatment for each individual
inmate.311
Inmates in solitary confinement should also be provided with
group counseling sessions. Even if the prison argues that the inmate
is a security threat and he, therefore, cannot be around others,
group counseling provides a second chance for an inmate to learn
how to communicate and behave in a small group setting. Moreover,
the sessions allow inmates to learn to work together to address
issues such as drugs and other addictions.312 Additionally, if an
inmate feels uncomfortable sharing one-on-one with his counselor,
he can have another option by sharing in a group with others who
may feel the same way. These group sessions can teach the inmates
to work with one another so as to better assimilate once released
back into the general prison population.313
Finally, there needs to be better mental health training for
prison staff. It is not uncommon that non-medical staff are the ones
that interact with prisoners the most.314 They are sometimes also
used to dispense prisoners’ medical drugs.315 These individuals
should undergo constant mandatory training to ensure their
understanding of mental health care and what they can or cannot
do in violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights. Training these
individuals would allow courts to prevent hearing frivolous
arguments and misusage of qualified immunity protections where
prison officials claim they did not know the law or the constitutional
bounds of their actions. Moreover, it prevents prison officials from
haphazardly giving prisoners medicine or withholding medicine out
of punishment. Similar mental health trainings have been
implemented in police reform to “reduce stigma and better
recognize the symptoms of a mental health crisis to support
311. Psychotherapy Guide: Group Therapy vs. Individual Therapy, AM.
ADDICTION CTRS., americanaddictioncenters.org/therapy-treatment/groupindividual (last updated June 13, 2019) (stating that individual therapy is
advantageous because it “allows the therapist to be very thorough in
understanding the specific problems of the client and in developing an
individualized approach to helping the client” and that “[t]he level of analysis
and treatment can be much more intense and comprehensive in individual
therapy compared to group therapy”).
312. Ctr. for Substance Abuse Treatment, Substance Abuse Treatment:
Group Therapy, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. 2 (2005),
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK64223/.
313. Id. (stating that “groups benefitted the members emotionally due to
supporting one another in shared experiences” and that group psychotherapy
provided observable benefits to veterans following World War II).
314. Arriaga, supra note 239.
315. Id.
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improved emergency response.”316 Prison staff should similarly
receive training that will allow them to understand mental health
and be adequately trained and equipped to handle individuals who
suffer from mental health illnesses in prisons. Considering the high
correlation between time spent in solitary confinement and the
psychological effects manifested, adequate training is even more
imperative to handle individuals placed in solitary.317
In light of the negative effects solitary confinement has on
inmates, this Comment advocates that it is necessary for the United
States Supreme Court to set clear durational guidelines as to how
long a prisoner can be placed in solitary. In addition, if prisons are
going to be allowed to continue this practice, then there should be
required outdoor recreation time and adequate mental healthcare
to protect inmates against these deleterious effects on their
psychological, mental, and emotional well-being.

V. CONCLUSION
Each year, thousands of individuals are placed in solitary
confinement. We as a nation have recognized the severe effects of
solitary confinement for over a hundred years now.318 Yet little has
been done to address this constitutional issue. Because of the
Supreme Court’s refusal to establish mandates and boundaries for
solitary confinement, each year we have thousands of individuals
painfully wasting away in the confines of their dark, small cells.
Their calls for help are left unheard. Many of these individuals are
thrown in these conditions for crimes society may deem to be “less
deserving” of harsh punishment yet they are nonetheless placed in
316. Compare Rahm Emmanuel, Citywide Mental Health Steering Comm.
Takes Steps on Police Reform, Mental Health Crisis Response, CTY. OF CHI. (Jun.
25, 2018), www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/cdph/provdrs/healthy_living/
news/2018/june/citywide-mental-health-steering-committee-takes-steps-onpolice-.html (emphasizing the City of Chicago’s efforts to “improve crisis
response through trauma-informed practices to better identify, serve and
ultimately treat those individuals with mental health challenges during a
crisis”) with Mental Health First Aid for Public Safety, THE NAT’L COUNCIL FOR
BEHAV. HEALTH (2018), www.thenationalcouncil.org/about/mental-health-firstaid/mental-health-first-aid-public-safety/ (establishing an 8-hour course to help
officers better understand addictions, and providing effective response options
to de-escalate incidents without compromising safety) “Approximately 80,000
public safety professionals have taken Mental Health First Aid for Public Safety
to date.” Id.
317. See discussion supra Sections II.D.1-3 (discussing the experimental
findings from research of animals and humans held in isolation); see also
Grassian, supra note 96, at 346 (stating that “. . . longer duration of the sensory
deprivation experience ha[s] [] been associated with an increased risk of adverse
psychiatric consequences”).
318. See In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (recognizing the effects of solitary
confinement in 1890).
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isolation for long periods of time.319
The proposals set by this Comment understandably may
financially burden the correctional facilities. However, the Supreme
Court has held that financial strains alone cannot justify violating
an individual’s liberty.320 It is costly for correctional facilities to
utilize solitary confinement practices in a constitutional manner.
However, these facilities choose to continue this practice. If they
choose to do so, then they must bear the financial consequences to
make this practice right. Justice Sotomayor recently, and
accurately, portrayed solitary confinement as “perilously close to a
penal tomb.”321 Her call for “[c]ourts and corrections officials . . . [to]
remain alert to the clear constitutional problems raised by keeping
prisoners” in isolation should give the Supreme Court the wakeup
call it so desperately needs.322

319. The Editors, supra note 20.
320. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340 (holding that the courts cannot withhold
the right to counsel if an individual does not have the financial means to hire
an attorney).
321. Weis, supra note 229.
322. Id.
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